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THE HUSTON PLA...~
A. Facts
On June 5, 1970, the President held a meeting with FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover, Defense Intelligence Agency Director
Donald Bennett, National Security Agency Director Noel Gayler, and
Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms. (Book VII,
Part 1, p. 375) Also present were H. R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman,
and Presidential Staff Assistant Tom Huston. (Book VII, Part 1,
p. 375) The President discussed the need for better domestic intel-
ligence operations in light of an esca l at Lng level of_bombings and
other acts of domestic violence. (Book VII, Part 1, p. 22) The
President asked the Intelligence Agency Directors for their recom-
mendations on whether the government's intelligence services were
being hampered by restraints on intelligence gathering methods.
Huston has testified that it was the opinion of the Directors that
they were in fact being hampered. (Book VII, Part 1, p. 378) The
President appointed Hoover, General Bennett, Admiral Gayler, and
Helms to be an ad hoc committee to study intelligence needs and
cooperation among the Intelligence Agencies, and to make recommenda-
tions. Hoover was designated Chairman and Huston served as \'[hite
House liaison. (Book VII, Part 1, p. 22)
On June 25, 1970 this ad hoc committee completed its
report, entitled "Special Report Interagency Committee on Intelligence
(Ad Hoc)" (hereafter lISpecial Reportll).
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The first page of the Special Report, immediately following
the title page, bore the following notation:
"June 25, 1970
This report, prepared for the President,
is approved by all members of this comm i t t ee
and their signatures are affixed hereto.
lsi J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Chairman
/s/ Richard Helms
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
/s/ Lt. General D. V. Dennett. USA
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
/s/ Vice Admiral Noel Ga"vler. USN
Director, National Securi~y A~ency II
(Book VII, Part 1, p. 385)
Part One of the Special Report, entitled "Summary of"
Internal Seclirity Threat," was a lengthy threat assessment, including
assessments of the current internal security threat of various domestic
groUPS, of the intelligence services of communist countries, and of other
revolutionary groups. (Book VII, Part 1, pp. 389 - 410)
Part T\,1o,entitled "Restraints on Intelligence Collection,"
waS a discussion of official restraints under which six types of United
States intelligence collection procedures operated, and of the advantagas
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-3-
and disadvantages of continuing or lifting such restraints. (Book VII,
Part 1, pp. 411 - 429)
Part Three, entitled .IIEvaluation of Interagency Coordination,"
assessed thed~gree of coordination between the Intelligence Agencies
and recommended means toiw~rove it. (Book VII, Part 1, pp. 430 - 431)
Although the Special Report took no position with respect to
the alternative decisions listed, it included statements in footnotes
that the FBI objected to lifting the restraints discussed, except
those on legal mail coverage (keeping a record of the return address
of communications addressed to an individual) and National Security
Agency communications intelligence. (Book VII, Part 1, pp. 416,
419, 421, 424, and 427)
During the first week of July, 1970, Huston sent the Special
Report, together Hith a memorandum entitled "Operational Restraints On
Intelligence Collection," to Haldeman. In the memorandum Huston recom-
mended that most, although not all, of the present procedures imposing
restraints on intelligence collection activities should be changed.
Huston's recommendations included the folloving:
"Electronic Surveillances and Penetrations.
Recommendation:
Present procedures should be changed to permit
intensification of coverage of individuals and groups
in the United States vho pose a major threat to the
internal security.
[12258]
-4-
.•• Mail Coverage.
Recommendation:
Restrictions on legal coverage should be removed.
ALSO, present restrictions on covert coverage should
be relaxed on selected targets of priority foreign
intelligence and internal security interest.
Rationale: .... Covert coverage is illegal and
there are serious risks involved. However, the advantages
to be derived from its use outweigh the risks. This
technique is particularly valuable in identifying
espionage agents and other contacts of foreign intelli-
gence services.
Surreptitious Entry.
Recommendation:
Present restrictions should be modified to permit
orocurement of vitally nepned Foreign cryptographic
material.
ALSO, present restrictions should be modified to
permit selective use of this technique ogainst other
urgent and high priority internal security targets.
Rationale:
Use of this technique is clearly illegal: it
amounts to burglary. It is also highly risky and
could result in great embarrassment if exposed.
However, it is also the most fruitful tool and can
produce the type of· intelligence wh i.ch cannot be
obtained in any other fashion.
The FBI, in Mr. Hoover's younger days, used to
conduct such o~erations with great success and with
no exposure. The infornation secured was invaluable."
(Book VII, Part 1, pp. 438 - 440)
On July 14, 1970, I-ialdemansent a memorandum to Huston stating,
"The recommendations you have proposed as a result of the rev Lew have
been approved by the President. . . . The formal official memorandum
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should, of course, be prepared and that should be the device by
which to carry it out." (Book VII, Part 1, p , 447)
On July 23, 1970 Huston sent a "decision memorandum" en-
titled "Domestic Intelligence" to each ,of the Directors of the four
Intelligence Agencies, informing them of the options approved by
the President. (Book VII, Part 1, p. 454)
Shortly after the decision memorandum of July 23, 1970 had
been received by Mr. Hoover, Huston received a telephone call from
Assistant FBI Director William Sullivan indicating that Hoover had
been very upset by the decision memorandum, and that Hoover either had
talked or intended to talk to the Attorney General to undertake steps
t-n haHo tho decLs 'ons reflected in rhe m~morandum reversed. (Bonk VTr,
part 1, p. 470) On or before July 27, 1970, Director Hoover met with
Attor~ey General Hitchell, who joined with Hoover in opposing the
recommendations contained in the memorandum of July 23, 1970.
VII, Part 1, p. 463)
Shortly after his telephone conversation with Sullivan,
(Book
Huston received a call from Haldeman indicating that the Attorney
General had talked to the President, or that Haldeman had talked to
the Attorney General an~ then to the President, but that, in any event,
Huston was instructed to recall the decision memorandum; that the
President desired to reconsider the matter, and that Haldeman, Hoover,
and the Attorney General would have a meeting in the near future to
discuss the matter. (Book VII, Part 1, p. 470)
[12260]
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Huston arranged for the recall of the document through the
White House Situation Room. (Book VII, Part 1, p. 470) Copies of
the decision memorandum on "Domestic Intelligence" were returned by
each of the four Intelligence Agencies to the White House Situation Room
on or about July 28, 1970. (Book VII, Part 1, pp. 472, 474) Although
Huston continued to press for adoption of his recommendations (Book VII,
Part 1, pp. 480-85), the plans for lifting operational restraints. on
1/intelligence collection activities were not reinstituted.
B. Discussion.
1. With respect to electronic surveillances and penetra-
tions, the Special Report of the Interagency Committee stated, "The
President historically has had the authority to act in matters of
national security. In addition, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 provides a statutory basis." (Book VII,
1/ In or before December, 1970, when John Dean had assumed responsi-
bility for matters of domestic intelligence for internal ~ecurity
purposes, an Intelligence Evaluation Committee 'vas created to
improve coordination among the intelligence community and to pre-
pare evaluations and estimates of domestic intelligence. (Book
VII, Part 1, pp. 487, 497) This step may be seen as an outgrowth
of the reconm1endations in Part Three of the Special Report,
entitled "Evaluation of Interagency Coordination." (Book VII,
Part 1, pp. 430-31)
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Part 1, p. 415) The Special Report also stated that routine mail
coverage was legal. (Book VII, Part 1, p. 417) Other intelligence
collection activities, such as .development of campus sources, appeared
to present political rather than legal questions.
However, with respect to both covert mail coverage and
surreptitious entry, both the Interagency Committee's Special Report
and the "Operational Restraints" memorandum prepared by Huston stated
that such intelligence collection activities were illegal. (Book VII,
Part 1, pp. 418, 420, 439 and 440) The President's approval of
Huston's recommendations in these areas may consequently be viewed
as approval of othen.,ise illegal actions by government agencies.
2. The Special Report was prepared by a committee con-
sisting of intelligence professionals from each of the four Intel-
ligence Agencies. Although it did not make recommendations, it
listed as options the relaxation or removal of restrictions on all
categories of intelligence collection activities. The recommendations
made by Huston in the "Operational Restraints" memorandum are taken
verbatim from among the options listed by the Special Report of the
Interagency Con®ittee; they do not go beyond options listed by the
Committee. The Special Report was approved by all members of the
Committee, consisting of the Directors of the four Intelligence
Agencies, and their signatures were affixed to the first page. This
approval mi~lt have been taken by Haldeman or by the President to
indicate that the options listed were not regarded as improper by
[12262]
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the professional United States intelligence community, despite the
footnoted objections of Mr. Hoover contained in the body of Part T"70
of the Special Report.
3. The options of lifting restraints on intelligence
gathering activities, listed in Part Two of the Special Report, were
intended to be taken in the context of the threat assessment contained
in Part One of the Special Report. There had been a substantial number
of bombings and riots in the spring and summer of 1970. (Book VII,
Part 1, p. 377) Part One stated that communist intelligence services
possessed a capability for actively fomenting domestic unrest, although
it :::l~~st::.tedthat there had been no suhstantial indications that
this had yet occurred. (Book VII, Part 1, p. 402)
4. The recommendations by Huston contained in the memo-
randum entitled "Operational Restraints on Intelligence Collection"
are cast in general terms, e.g., "present procedures should be changed"
(electronic surveillance), or "relaxed" (mail coverage), or "modified"
(surreptitious entry). (Book VII, Part 1, pp. 438-39) Much might
have depended upon how the modifications might have been implemented.
5. The President's approval in principle of modifying
some operational restraints which had been in existence since 1966
"as withdralm ,vithin five days after the circulation of Huston's
decision memorandum, which was the device for carrying out the re-
conunendations. (Book V1I, .Part 1, pp. 447, 472, 474) There is no
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evidence before the Committee that any illegal mail coverage, sur-
~eptitious entry, or electronic surveillance or penetration was ever
undertaken, during these five days, under the authority of the
decision memorandum.
6. It has occasionally been urged that the formation and
operation of the "Plumbers" group is evidence that the Huston Plan
was not actually rescinded. This is untenable. The two matters
were handled by entirely different groups of White House staff members
and they arose a year apart. The problem to which the Huston Plan
was directed was, essentially, domestic violence, whereas the "Plumbers"
werp rnnrprned with news leaks and the theft of the Pentagon Papers.
It strains the facts to find any connection bet,veen the two.
[12264]
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KLEINDIENST CONFIRMATION HEARINGS
A. Facts*
On February 15, 1972, the President nominated Deputy
Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst to be Attorney General of the
United States to succeed John N. Mitchell, who was leaving the Depart-
ment of Justice to campaign for the re-election of the President.
The Senate Committee on the Judi~iary held brief hearings on the
nomination and quickly voted to recommend that 'the nomination be
confirmed. (HJC, Statement of Information, Book V, Part 1, 605.
Hereinafter cited by book, part and page number.)
On February 29, 1972, Jack Anderson, a newspaper columnist,
published the first of three articles alleging that three antitrust
cases, commenced by the Department of Justice in 1969, had been
settled favorably to the defendant, the International Telephone &
Telegraph Corporation (ITT), in 1971 in return for a large financial
The Committee's investigation of the ITT case was originally
focused on allegations that the Administration and the President
had settled the three ITT antitrust cases in exchange for an ITT
pledge of financial support for the 19)2 Republican National'
Convention. However, during the course of the Staff's investiga-
tion the focus shifted to Presidential involvement in the 1972
Kleindienst Confirmation Hearings. The Special Prosecutor has
also concluded that no impropriety existed during the 1971 period
but is investigating possible offenses in connection with the
1972 hearings. Thus there will be no discussion herein of the
1971 events except as they specifically relate to the testimony
of the witnesses during the 1972 hearings.
[12266]
-2-
contribution to the 1972 Republican National Convention in San Diego.
Kleindienst immediately asked that the Senate Judiciary Hearings be
reconvened in order that he might answer these allegations. (Book
V, Part 2, 633)
On March 2, 1972, pursuant to Kleindienst's request, the
hearings reconvened. The purpose of the hearings was to determine
what connection, if any, existed between the settlement of the ITT
antitrust cases and the ITT convention contributions. In connection
with the investigation, the Senate Committee ortthe Judiciary inquired
into several areas including: (1) the extent of involvement of the
White House in the filing, handling and settling of the ITT antitrust
cases; (2) the circumstances under which the ITT convention pledge
was obtained; and (3) the actions of the Department of Justice per-
sonnel in the ITT antitrust cases. Several of the \vitnesses before
the Committee were questioned specifically in regard to those areas.
(Book V, Part 2, 677-904., passim)
Richard Kleindienst testified that he had never been inter-
fered with by anyone at the \~ite House in the exercise of his responsi-
bilities in the ITT antitrust cases. (Book V, Part 2, 677-80, 729-34,
755-58, 849-53) That testimony was untrue, in that on April 19, 1971,
the day before an appeal was due to be filed in the Supreme Court in
the ITT-Grinnell case, the President telephoned Kleindienst and
ordered that the appeal not be filed. (Book V, Part 1, 311) Further,
in his Senate testimony, Kleindienst described the circumstances of
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the decision to delay this appeal without mentioning the President's
phone call. (Book V, Part 2, 729-34, 751-54)
On May 16, 1974 Kleindienst pleaded guilty to an information
charging a failure to answer accurately and fully questions pertinent
to the Senate Judiciary Committee's inquiry, in violation of 2 U.S.C.
§192. (Book V, Part 2, 965)
John N. Mitchell testified in part as to his involvement in
the handling of the ITT antitrust cases. Mitchell testified that he
had recused himself in the ITT cases. (Book V, Part 2, 771) In fact,
Mitchell had been involved in contacts with ITT officials concerning
the cases during 1970 and had various discussions with White House
staff members about the ITT antitrust cases. (Book V, Part 1, 143)
In his Senate testimony, Mitchell denied that he had ever discussed
the ITT antitrust cases with the President, although he had specifically
discussed the ITT-Grinnell appeal with the President on April 21, 1971,
two days after the President's order to Kleindienst. (Book V, Part 1,
371-76; Part 2, 771-75) In that discussion Mitchell had persuaded
the President not to interfere with the appeal of ITT-Grinnell to the
-Supreme Court. (Book V, Part 1, 371)
Evidence Relating to Presidential Involvement
Whatever evidence of Presidential involvement in and
knowledge of the events of the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings in
March and April, 1972 may exist is entirely circumstantial.
The President returned from China on the evening of February
28, 1972. After spending a few days in Key Biscayne the President
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began his first full day in the White House on Monday, March 6. (Book
V, Part 1, 141-42) Four days earlier, on the evening of March 2,
several politically embarrassing documents had been delivered by an
ITT representative to a White House aide, Wallace Johnson, who in
turn gave them to John Mitchell and Charles Colson. (Book V, Part 2,
681) Three days earlier, on March 3, Richard Kleindienst had
testified about the circumstances surrounding the delay of the appeal
of the ITT-Grinnell case a year earlier. (Book V, Part 2, 729-34)
On Monday, March 6, the President met, and talked by telephone,
1/
with three of his top aides, Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Colson.- After
a noon-hour meeting with the President, John Ehrlichman met with SEC
Chairman Casey, apparently in an attempt to shortcut an SEC subpoena
of the politically sensitive documents that had been delivered by ITT
to the White House on March 2. (Book V, Part 2, 735) Also on March
6, Richard Kleindienst's diary reflects the fact that he was at the
White House for a Cabinet meeting with the President. (Richard
Kleindienst diar~ submitted to the Inquiry staff after the initial
presentation to the Committee of information regarding the ITT matter.)
The next day Kleindienst in a detailed statement to the Senate Committee
described the events of April 19, 1971 without mentioning the Presi-
dent's order to him not to file the ITT-Grinnell appeal. (Book V,
Part 2, 751)
}j On June 24, 1974 the Committee issued a subpoena to the Presidentfor tapes, dictabe1ts, memoranda and other records of these meetings
and conversations. Such materials, if they exist, have not yet
been furnished to the Con~ittee.
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On March 14, 1972, John Mitchell appeared before the Senate
Judiciary Committee and twice testified that there had been no communi-
cations between the President and him with respect to the ITT antitrust
1/
litigation or any other antitrust litigation.- That evening the
President and Mr. Mitchell had their only telephone conversation
during March of which the Committee staff is aware. (Book V, Part 2,
771) Mr. Mitchell has denied in an unsworn interview with the Inquiry
staff that he discussed his testimony, or the testimony of any other
witness before the Senate Committee with the President, with Mr.
Kleindienst, or with any members of the President's staff.
According to Charles Colson's calendar, he spent the morning
of March 18, 1972 on "ITT" matters. He had three telephone conversa-
tions with Mr. Mitchell during the morning. In his interview with
the staff Mr. Mitchell did not recall any conversations with Colson.
'!:_/
That afternoon the President and Colson met for over two hours.
On March 24, 1972, the President held his only press con-
ference of this period. He said that:
as far as the [Senate Judiciary Committee]
hearings are concerned, there is nothing that has
happened in the hearings to date that has in one
1/ On June 24, 1972, the Committee issued a subpoena to the President
for tapes, dictabelts, memoranda, and other records of that conver-
sation. Such materials, if they exist, have not yet been furnished
to the Committee.
'!:_/ On June 24, 1972 the Committee issued a subpoena to the President
for tapes, dictabelts, memoranda, and other records of that meeting.
Such materials, if they exist, have not yet been furnished to the
Committee.
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way shaken my confidence in Nr. Kleindienst as an
able, honest man, fully qualified to be Attorney
General of the United States.
In this press conference, the President also said that, "We moved on
[ITT]. We moved on it effectively •.• Mr. McLaren is justifiably very
proud of that record •.. [and he] should be." He said that Admin-
istration action had prevented ITT from groving further and quoted
Solicitor General Griswold as to the excellence of the ITT settlement.
(Book V, Part 2, 799)
Charles Colson testified before ,the Committee as to a meeting
during this time period that he attended with the President and
Haldeman. Colson testified that the President recalled that he had
made a telephone call to Kleindienst:
Mr. Colson. I recall one instance when the President
was basically talking to Haldeman, but I was in the
room and obviously the question of his involvement in
the ITT Settlement had somehow come up.
Mr. Jenner. When you say his you are referring to who?
Mr. Colson. The President.
Mr. Jenner. All right.
Mr. Colson. Because he said do you, he said to Haldeman,
he said do you remember the time I called Kleindienst
and got very agitated or very excited with Dick and did
I discuss the ITT case or was I talking about policy.
And Bob said no you were talking about policy, you
weren't discussing the case.
And the President said are you sure?
And Haldeman said yes, either I 'vas there whLLe you
called or Ehrlichman was there and heard your call and
the President said, thank God I :didn't discuss the case.
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Mr. Jenner. Do you have a recollection with better
certainty that this conversation you have now described
took place during the span of the ITT-Kleindienst
hearings.
Mr. Colson. Yes, I think it did. I can't imagine
why it would come up at another time. I think it
must have -- I know it is the first time I ever knew
the President talked to Kleindienst about this matter
at all. And I don't think I learned about it until
late in the month and I remember learning about Lt; in
that fashion, that the President was trying to recall
what he had said to Kleindienst. (Charles Colson
testimony, House Judiciary Comn1ittee (HJC), T.434l-
43) 1:./
Colson also testified that on March 27 and 28, 1972 he and
Clark MacGregor met with the President and presented to him the
reasons why' they felt the nomination of Kleindienst should be with-
'l:_/
drawn. Colson testified that he left that meeting feeling that
the President was inclined to agree that the nomination should be
withdravm. (Colson testimony, HJC, T 43l14-46)
On March 29, Colson and MacGregor met with H. R. Haldeman
who informed them that the President was going to meet with Kleindienst
that afternoon to determine whether or not Kleindienst would withdraw
his name from consideration. (Colson testimony, HJC, T 4346-47)
Colson also testified that on the mOTI1ing,of March 30, he and MacGregor
met with Haldeman who described the President's meeting with Kleindienst
Citations to testimony are to the typewritten transcripts; at this
writing printed transcripts are not yet available.
'l:_/ Tapes of that meeting have neither been requested nor subpoenaed
by the Committee, because the Staff was unaware of their relevance
until Colson's testimony ",as received.
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in which Kleindienst convinced the President that the nomination
should not be withdrawn. (Colson testimony, HJC, T 4348-51) However,
in an unsworn interview with the staff, Kleindienst stated that he had no
contact with anyone at the White House during March, April and May
of 1972.
Colson took notes of his meeting with Haldeman and MacGregor
(Exhibit 22 to Charles Colson testimony, HJC, T 4349) and later
returned to his office to dictate a memorandum to Haldeman that
argued that the nomination should be withdrawn. (Colson testimony,
HJC, T 4352) His reasons included the fact that he had reviewed
documents that would tend to contradict Mitchell's testimony to the
Senate Committee. (Book V, Part 2, pp. 805-09) Later that day Colson
met wLth the President· and'informed him that he had written such a
})
memorandum. After meeting with the President, Colson sent the
memorandum to H. R. Haldeman. Colson testified that by normal practice
the memorandum would be given by Mr. Haldeman to the President.
(Colson testimony, HJC, T 4356-57)
Mr. Mitchell has told the Inquiry staff that, near the end
.of March, he recalls generally that he conveyed to the President,
either directly, or through Mr. Haldeman, his view that the Kleindienst
!/ On June 24, 1974, the Committee issued a subpoena to the President
for tapes, dictabelts, memoranda and other records of meetings and
conversations on March 30,1972, between the President and Haldeman,
Ehrlichman, Colson or any of them. Such materials, if they exist,
have not yet been furnished to the Conunittee.
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nomination should not be withdrawn but that he recalls no specific
conversations.
On April 4, 1972 the President met four times with Haldeman
and talked once by telephone with Colson. During the afternoon the
President met with Haldeman and Mitchell and discussed, among other
1/things, changing the convention site from San Diego to Miami. An
edited transcript of this conversation has been supplied to the Com-
'!:_/
mittee. This edited transcrip~ indicates no evidence of Presiden-
tial knowledge of the testimony of Kleindienst or Mitchell, and indeed
shows that there was very little discussion of the hearings.
On June 8, 1972, Kleindienst was confirmed by the Senate.
On June 12, 1972, Kleindienst was appointed to the Office of the
Attorney General, and was sworn in at a ceremony at the ~1ite House
attended by the President. (Book V, Part 2, 901)
During the period that the Kleindienst nomination was
pending before the Senate, the press provided extensive coverage of
the hearings, the debates and the final vote. (Book V, Part 2, 855)
On June 24, 1974 the Committee issued a subpoena to the President
for tapes, dictabelts, memoranda and other records of all but the
last meeting. Such materials, if they exist, have not yet been
furnished to the Committee. On May 15, 1974, the Committee sub-
poenaed the tape and other materials relating to the April 4
meeting between the President, Haldeman and Mi tchell.
'!:_/ The President has invited the Chairman and ranking member to
verify that this transcript accurately reflects the discussion.
To this date this invitation has not been accepted.
[12274]
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This press coverage was reflected in the news summaries prepared
1/
daily by the White House staff for the President.
On January 8, 1974 the Office of the \lliiteHouse Press
Secretary issued a "White Paper" entitled, "The ITT Antitrust
Decision", describing the President's role in the ITT antitrust
cases and their settlement. The White Paper denied that the
President had any involvement in the ITT settlement and denied that
the settlement was made in exchange for an ITT convention pledge,
but admitted the telephone call to Kleindienst. (Book V, Part 2,
956)
1/ On June 24, 197!+, the Committee issued a subpoena for thePresident's copies of the news summaries compiled during the
period February 22, 1972 through June 2, 1972, inclusive. On
July 12, 1974, the President's Special Counsel responded by
letter to the subpoena and in part agreed to furnish the Conunittee
copies of summaries which were actually presented to the President.
Mr. St. Clair has informed the Committee that the news summaries
show no notation by the President on those portions dealing with
the ITT/Kleindienst Hearings, and offered to allow the Chairman
and Ranking Ninority Nember to examine the summaries to verify
that fact. To date that invitation has not been accepted.
[12275]
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B. Theories of the Evidence
1. Summary of Information: Constitutional Theory
The Summary of Information argues that a President has a
duty to transmit information to the Senate about his nominee's
testimony given to a Senate Con~ittee considering the nominee's
qualification to hold office. This duty rests on the Senate's
power to advise and consent to the nomination. The theory behind this
duty is that the constitutional safeguard of Senate confirmation
could be frustrated if the President permitted the Senate to act on
the basis of any information which is untrue, even in part. As this
case is included under the general category of abuse of power, the
Summary of Information also argues that a President abuses his power
by appointing the nominee after his confirmation has been tainted.
2. Applicable Criminal Law
Title 18 U.S.C. §4, entitled "Misprision of Felony."
provides:
v.Jhoever,having knmvledge of the actual commission
of a felony cognizable by a court of the United
States conceals and does not as soon as possible
make known the same to some judge or other person
in civil or military authority under the United
States, shall be fined not more than $500 or
imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
3. Questions of Fact
tfuatever view of the evidence is taken, certain preliminary
questions of fact must be answered before ~rongful conduct on the part
of the President may be established.
[12276]
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(a) Has the Testimony of Kleindienst and Mitchell perjury?
In the course of their testimony before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, Kleindienst and Mitchell appear to have
given incorrect or misleading testimony several times. Kleindienst
apparently misled the Committee about the nature of his contacts
with the Hhite House in the filing, handling and settlement of the
, .
ITT antitrust cases. Mitchell apparently misled the Committee about
his contact with the Hhite House and with ITT officials regarding
the ITT cases, and he further was evasive about his involvement in
the Administration's decision to select Sa~ Diego as the site of the
1972 Republican National Convention. Certain statements by Kleindienst
and Mitchell appear to be clearly incorrect. On March 7, 1972, Kleindienst
described the reasons for the decision to delay the ITT-Grinnell
appeal on April 19, 1971, without mentioning the President's telephone
call of that day in which the President ordered the appeal to
be dropped. On Harch 14, 1972, Mitchell stated that he never discussed
the ITT antitrust cases with the President, whereas actually he had
1:./
discussed the appeal with the President on April 21, 1971.
A factual issue may be raised as to the intent of Kleindienst
and Mitchell in these misstatements. In his interview with the Inquiry staff,
for example, Hr. Nitchell indicated that what he meant when he denied
talking to the President about the ITT cases, was that he had never
talked to the President about the merits of those cases.
1/ To date, neither Kleindienst nor Hitchell has been prosecuted
for perjury in connection with the ITT hearings. Kleindienst
has pleaded to the lesser offense of failure to fully respond
under 2 U.S.C. §192. Hitchell has not been prosecuted for
any act relating to the ITT/Kleindienst hearings.
[12277]
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The question to which Mr. Kleindienst directed his attention
and misstatements, by way of contrast, was specifically why the ITT-
Grinnell appeal to the Supreme Court in April 1971 was delayed. However,
the misstatements of Kleindienst may be subject to the defense of
"literal truth.1t The lengthy statement which Kleindienst read to
theCowuittee on March 7, 1972, omitting any mention of the President's
telephone call, may be misleading but not in fact false. Kleindienst's
statement related only actual events of April 19 minus the telephone
c&ll, and therefore it may be literally true but incomplete. Under
the recent decision in Branston v~ United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973),
in which the Court held that testimony that is literally true but
arguably misleading by negative implication is not perjury, it could
be argued that Kleindienst's remarks on March 7 did not constitute
perjury.
It is also possible that the misstatements were not perjury
because they were not material. The test of materiality is simply
whether the testimony has a natural effect or tendency to influence,
impede or dissuade the investigative body from pursuing its investi-
gation. United States v. Morgan, 1% F. 2d 623 (2d Cir. 1952), cert.
~enied, 343 U.S. 965 (1952). The Senate Committee on the Judiciary
was charged wi.th evaluating the qualificatiDns of Richard Kleindienst
to be Attorney General. In the exercise of this constitutional
responsibility the Senate Committee 'vasinvestigating the connection
between the ITT antitrust cases and the ITT convention pledge. The
fact that the President had intervened in the handling of the ITT cases
might have been of substantial interest to the Comm i t tee , if only
because it specifically involved the norlineebefore the Committee and
his predecessor in office. [12278]
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On the other hand, it may be argued that the Senate Committee's
investigation into the ITT scandal was focused properly only on the
settlement of the ITT cases and the reasons for the settlement, so
that a misstatement about the .appeal would not be material to the
Committee's inquiry. It may be questioned, furthermore, whether
disclosure of the President's telephone call to Kleindienst,
and the latter's successful resistance, would have had any adverse
impact upon the Committee's judgment as to Mr. Kleindienst's qualifi-
cations.
(b) Did the President have kno\.;r1edgeof the testimony of
Kleindienst and Mitchell?
Evidence Supporting Presidential Knowledge. of
Testimony
The evidence of Presidential knowledge comes. first from the
fact that the testimony of the \vitnesses before the hearings was
extensively reported in the press and broadcast media. Second, the
President had a telephone conversation with Mitchell on the evening
of March 14, the day of Mitchell's perjured testimony. Third, the
President indicated in his March 24 press conference that he was
familiar with the hearings and the testimony of the witnesses. Fourth,
Colson has testified that Ea1deman informed him on Harch 29 and 30
that the President intended to, and did in fact, meet with Kleindienst
on the afternoon of Harch 29. It coul~ be inferred from this meeting
that the President learned of and discussed Kleindienst's misleading
testimony. Fifth, Charles Colson's Narch 30 memo randum to I'a Lderaan
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cites certain documents in White House files that contradicted
Mitchellts testimony and tended to show that the President was
involved in the ITT case in 1971. If the President read this memorandum,
he might have realized that evidence existed that contradicted the
testimony of Mitchell before the Committee.
Evidence Negating Presidential Knowledge of TestimonL
First, no direct evidence of actual Presidential knowledge
exists. Except for the President's general statement in his press
conference of March 24, the evidence is entirely inferential. Second,
Kleindienst's testimony concerning the appeal was not generally
reported in the press. The focus of the news media was on the
allegations concerning the settlement of the ITT cases, not the
appeal of the ITT-Grinnell case. It is, therefore, unlikely
that the President learned of Kleindienst's perjury by way of
the media. Third; the press conference of March 24 does not indicate
specific knowledge of the actual testimony of either Kleindienst or
Mitchell. Charles Colson and other witnesses have informed the staff
that the President does not prepare for news briefings by studying
primary news sources, Instead he utilizes a briefing book prepared
by his staff. There is no evidence before the Corunittee as to what
the briefing book for the President's Harch 24 press conference
contained. Nor has the Comnlittee requested this briefing book; Fourth,
although H. R. Haldeman may have told Charles Colson that Kleindienst
and the President me t on the afternoon of Harch 29, Kleindienst has
[12280]
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specifically denied this to the staff. Kleindienst also said that
he had had no conversations with anyone at the White House during
March, April and May of 1972. Fifth, although Colson's memo of
March 30 does indicate that documents contradicted Mitchell's
testimony, Charles Colson testified that he does not know whether
the President received or read the m~no. In addition, Colson has
testified to the Conmittee that he never discussed either his memo,
the documents described therein, or the testimony of Mitchell or
Kleindienst with the President. Nor did the President ever indicate
to Colson any awareness that Kleindienst had not told the truth to
the Senate Committee. (Colson testimony, HJC,. T. 4369)
(c) Did the President know or believe that the testimony of
Kleindienst and Mitchell was false?
The issue of whether the President would have known the
testimony of Kleindienst and Mitchell was false depends on whether
the President would have correctly recollected his contact with the
two about,the ITT~Grinnell appeal in April 1971, ten and one-half
months earlier.
Evidence Supporting Presidential Recollection of 1971
Events
The President was in fact a participant in the events of
April 19 and 21, 1971. The Summary of Information submitted to the
COlnmitteesuggests that the strident tone of the telephone call
to Kleindienst, and the fact that the President's conversation on
April 21, 1971 caused him to rescind his order to drop the ITT-Grinnell
[12281]
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appeal, make it seem likely that the President had such knowledge.
(Summary of Information re Kleindienst Appointment-ITT, p. 8) In
addition, Charles Colson has testified that he was present at a
meeting in which the President recalled that he had made a phone
call to Kleindienst and "blew up at him."
Evidence Negating Presidential Recollection of 1971 Events
The Kleindienst call lasted no more than three minutes; the
Mitchell discussion less than five. The conclusion is hardly compelled
that the President, in 19721 after the passage of ten and a half months
filled with events of the order of importance of his trip to China, would
advert to and recall the conversations.
Moreover, the evidence supports the conclusion that in fact
the President inaccurately recalled the substance of that telephone
call. Colson testified that the President was assured by Haldeman
that the call was not about the ITT case but rather was about the
antitrust policies of McLaren. According to Colson, the President
responded, "... thank God, I didn't discuss the case."
[12282]
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4. Constitutional Theory: Interference "'ith Power of Advice and
Consent; Abuse of Power of AUDointment
The Summary of Information contends that in connection with
nominations the President has a duty to come forward and correct the
record. As authority for this proposition, the arguments of James
Iredell relating to the treaty-making process, made in the No rth
Carolina Ratifying Convention, are cited:
[The President] must certainly be punishable for glvlng
false information to the Senate. He is to regulate all
intercourse with foreign powers, and it is his duty to
impart to the Senate eve~y material intelligence he
receives. If it should appear that he has not given
them full information, but has concealed important in-
telligence which he ought to have communicated, and by
that means induced them to enter into measures injurious
to their country, and which they would not have consented
to had the true state of things been disclosed to them,
,-~ in this case, I ask whe the r upon an impeachment for
a misdemeanor upon such an account, the Senate would
probably favor him. 1/
However, Iredell's remarks were directed to the trea.ty-rnakIng process,
where the Senate has a larger role than it does in the appointr:lent
process. In advising and consenting to treaties, the Senate has a
role nearly co-vext ens Ive with that of the President. The intent of
the Framers was that the President wou Ld meet wf.t h the Senate and
.?_/
consult on treaty projects.
<,
Consequently, the Senate has conferred
l/ 4 Elliot 127.
3/ Pierce Butler, a member of the Constitutional Conv~ntion~ is quoted
as f oLlows : "Treaties to be gone over clause by clause, by the President
and Senate together • • . •II cited in John Adams' I<lritings (ed , C.F.
Adams, 1851), III, p. 409. See Haynes, George F., 'i'heSenate of the
UniteG StatE.S - Its History ~d Practice, (Hough t on Nifflin Co ,, Doston,
1933)
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with the President throughout all stages of the treaty process - from
preliminary negotiations with foreign powers through supplementary
negotiations caused by reason of Senate amendments to treaties sub-
1:.1
mitted for ratification.
With respect to confirmation of nominees for office, by
way of contrast, substantive consultation between the Senate and
the President has been the exception rather than the rule:
In the early history of the country several connnittees
of the Senate sought to confer with the President
concerning his nominations. Both John Adams and
James Madison sent a message to the Senate maintaining
that it was contrary to the Constitution. Thereafter
no further attempt was made by a Senate connnittee to
confer formally with the President about a nomination,
though informal consultations be tween the President
and members of Congress are common and it has never
been contended that they are in any way improper.
Requests for information about nominees are usually
made to the d.epartment s concerned, and ordinarily
such information is supplied. Presidents, however,
have consistently asserted the right to withhold
confidential information. II
11 Eleven ciifferent Presidents f rom Hashington to Harding have
formally requested the Senate1s advice before entering upon proposed
negotiations. Moreover, after submission, the President and the
Senate have negotiated amendments to treaties which were subs~quently
ratified by foreign governments. Haynes, The Senate of the United
Statesl .~ra, pp. 590, 608.
21 Harris, The Advice and Consent of the Senate (University of California
Press, 1953), pp. 240~4l.
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Abuse of Power: Need for a Standard
Whether or not a President is legally capable of committing
II
a misprision within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §4~ it is submitted
that he must have known of and concealed perjury in order to be
liable in impeachment under the facts of the Kleindienst confirmation
case.
The bureaucratic considerations in favor of delineating
the bounds of "abuse of power" in the Kleindienst context by
reference to the elements of criminal misprision are, arguably,
roughly analogous to those which gave rise to the longstanding
Federal policy in this area, namely, the avoidance of reporting
burdens.
The significant practical ramifications of holding any
President accountable for his failure to correct the record when
testimony or other information supplied to Congress by Executive
branch officers is not perjurious, but only misleading, should be
obvious. No formulation of the "abuse of power" charge as general
as that set out in the Stmrnaryof Information should be adopted by
the Committee without reflecting upon these ramifications.
II See discussion, subsection (c), pp. 22-24, infra.
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5. Criminal Law: Hisprision of Felony
The statutory offense of misprision of felony has four
elements:
To sustain a convi.ction ... for mispri.sion of
felony it (is] incumbent upon the government to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt
~l) That . . . the principal hau committed and
completed the felony alleged prior to (the date
of the alleged misprision];
(2) That the defendant nad full knowledge of that
fact;
(3) That he failed to notify the authorities; and
(4) That he took (an] affirmative step to conceal
the crime of the principal. 1/
(a) 11Affirmative actll requirement
The basic reason for the affirmative act requirement seems
to be that to punish mere nondisclosure would impose an undue burden
on the citizen:
To suppose that Congress reached every failure to
disclose a known federal crime, in this day of myriad
federal tax statutes and regulatory laws, would impose
a vast and unmeasurable obligation. It would do vi.o-:
lence to the unspoken principle of the criminal law
that "as far as possible privacy should be respected. 11
United States v. Worcester, 190F. Supp. 548,565-67,
(D. Ha ss. 1960) (dictum) (\-1yzanski,J.).
In ~ v. Nichaud, 114 A. 2d 352, 355 (Ne., 1955) the
court similarly suggested that the requirement of an affirmative act
was necessary to prevent overbroad application of the statute:
l.l l.~ea1v , United States, 102 F. 2d 643, 646 (8th Cir. 1939); Lancey
v. Unj~te'dStates, 356 F. 2d 407) 409 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. den. %5
U.S-:-922; U~:.it2d States v. !:in3_)402 F. 2d 694, 695 (9th Cir-:l963).
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_The act of concealment must be alleged. Otherwise,
a person could be tried and erroneously convicted on
slight evidence that was only to the effect that he
was in the vicinity of where a felony was "ac tuaLl.y"
comm Lt ted , and from that improperly argue [sic] that
he must have "known ;!' and that he concealed because
he knew and did "not disclose." He might not have
seen. He might not have known or understood all the
facts.
A dictum of Chief Justice Marshall also reflects the
reluctance of the judiciary to construe misprision statutes so as
to punish bare non-disclosure of information:
It may be the duty of a_citizen to accuse every
offender, and to proclaim every offense which
comes to his knowledge; but the law which would
punish him in every case, for not performing this
duty, is too harsh for man. Marbury v. Brooks,
7 Ylheat. 556, 575-76 (1822).
(b) Degree of knowledge require~
Several Federal cases state that in order to support a
conviction for misprision, it is necessary to prove that the defendant
had "full know.Ledge " of the commission of the crime by the principal.
Neal v. United States, 102 F. 2d 643, 646 (8th Cir. 1939); Lancey v.
United States, 356 F. 2d (f07, Lf09 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. den. 385 U. S.
-922; pnited States v. Kin~, 402 F. 2d 694, 695 (9th Cir. 1968). In
Conunonwealth v ..~, _318 Mass. 453, 458:...59(1945), the court intimated
that mere "susp Ici.on" that a felony had been committed could not render
the defendant's silence criminal.
(c) Duty of a President of the United States under the mis-
prision statute
The federal misprision statute requires that felonies be
reporteci to ;'some judge or other person in civil or military authority
under the United States. II The President of the United States is the
[12287]
-23-
chief officer of the executive branch of the federal government. U. S.
Constitution, Article II, Section 1, clause 1. He is the Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. U. S. Constitution,
Article II, Section 2, clause 1. In view of the plain language of the
statute, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the President
is a Hperson in civil or military authority under the United States,ll
l/
within the meaning of the statute.
It is difficult to contend that all persons in civil or
military authority under the United States are, simply by virtue of
their positions, incapable of committ.ing the offen.se of misprision
of felony. Law enforcement officers have been prosecuted under
18 U.S.C. §4 __ although admittedly they were State, rather than
Federal, officials. Bratton v. United States, 73 F. 2d 795 (10th
Cir. 1934); United States v~ Daddano, 432 F. 2d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir,
1970), ~. dismissed 401 U.S. 967, cert. den. 402 U.S. 905.
In a case in which it is claimed that a United States official
has discharged his duty under 18 U.S.C. §4 by making a decision not
to prosecute a person known to have con®itted a felony, the appropriate
inquiry would seem to be ,vhether his decision not to prosecute constituted
the exercise of a function assigned to him by the Constitution or laws of
the United States.
1/ In England, the offense of misprlSl.On could be avoided by makinga report to the King. Concerning the punishment for concealment of
felonies, Coke wrote:
From wh Lch punishment if any will save himself he
must follow the advice of Eracton, to discover it
to the King, or to some judge or magistrate that for
the administration of justice supplieth his place,
with all speed that he can.
3 Inst. Cop. 65. [12288]
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GOVER.~MENT EXPENDITURES AT SAN CLEMENTE AND KEY BISCAYNE
A. Facts
The report submitted to the Committee by the Inquiry staff
on July 19, 1974, contains a detailed chronology of facts regarding
the initiation of, installation of and paynent for fifteen categories
1/
of government expenditures totaling over $92,000 - at President
N~xon's private properties at San Clemente and Key Biscayne in the
1/ San Clenente
Fireplace Exhaust Fan
Heating System
Sewe r System *
Landscape Construction and Maintenance
Den w.indovs
Boundary and Structural Surveys
Paving
Point Gazebo
Hand r a i.Ls
Beach Cabana and Railroad Crossing
$ 388.78
12,983.00
3,800.00
27,018.C8
1,6uu.Ou
5,472.59
5,866.66
4,981.60
938.50
3,500.00
$66,614.03
Key Biscayne
*Landscape Construction
Lands cape l'Iaintenance .~
Fence and Hedge Screen~
Shuffleboard
3,414.00
7,991.00
12,679.00
1,600.00
$ 25,684.00
*The Internal Revenue Service fOlliLd$58,954.77 of government eA~endi-
tures at San Clenente and $8,433.76 of government expenditures at Key
Biscs3yne to have constituted taxable income to the President for the
same period. The .it eras marked wi th an as terLs k= were found by the
[12290]
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years 1969 through 1972. The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue
Taxation found tnat these expenditures constituted taxable income
to the President. These expenditures were brought into question
on one or more of the following grounds:
(1) Although an expenditure was requested by the Secret
Service, either (a) substantial increases in cost were incurred
because of the personal aesthetic desires of the President or his
representatives~ or (b) the item primarily benefited the President
and only secondarily served a security function.
(2) An expenditure which primarily benefited the President
was requested by the President or his representatives rather than
by the Secret Service.
(3) Although an expenditure had a security justifl<.:ai..i.on,
the expenditure was one that any ho~eowner would likely and routinely
make at his own e~~ense.
Various expenditures on the President's private properties
were also questioned in the course of hearings before the SubcoS?~ttee
on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropr~ations of
!/ [cont'd]
Joint Committee staff,"but not by the IRS, to constitute taxable
income to the President. Taxable income attributable to improve-
ments for the year 1969 Here found by the Joint Committee staff
to be $62,441.75 and by the IRS to be $31,844.58. The President
has not yet paid tax deficiencies attributable to 1969. Any such
payment wo uLd be voluntary because the applicable Statute of
Limitations has run in respect to that year.
[12291]
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the House Appropriations Committee in June 1973; in hearings before
the Governmenf Activities Subcommittee of the House Government
Operations Committee in October 1973; in a report by the Comptroller
General to the Congress in December 1973; and in a report by the
House Government Operations Committee in May 1974. Each investiga-
tion concluded that some significant amount of nonprotective irnprove-
ments on the President's private properties Has inproper1y financed
by the GovernHent. This memorandum does not purport to review'
the accuracy of those determinations, although none of the reports, of
course, is conclusive upon the Members of this Committee as to any
issue.
The evidence tending to show Presidential knowledge of
the character of these expenditures. the manner in which they were
procured, and the source of their financing is as fo110\\1s:
San Clemente
1. The President visited San Clemente from March 21 to
1/
March 23, 1969. During that period, he and his family had
discussions with Harold Lynch, the President's private architectural
consultant, regarding the design of the swimming pool to be constructed.
Mrs. Nixon also walked the grounds with Lynch and expressed her desire
that the renovation work be done in a manner that would preserve the
]j
informal atmosphere of the estate.
1/ Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, "President
Nixon's Visits to the Hestern l,fuite House, San Clemente, California"
(Source: Agnes Haldron, I',.'hiteHouse, August 28, 1973); Lynch and
Kalmbach staff Ln tervf.ews,)
:?:...l Lynch staff Ln t ervf.ew,
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2. The President visited San Clemente over the period
J./
June 4 to June 7~.1969 in conjunction with a trip to Honolulu. During
this period discussions were taking place among representatives of
the President and Secret Service and GSA personnel regarding wo rk to
be performed on the estate.
3. The President visited San Clemente for a month
Jj
between August 9 and September 8, 1969. This period immediately
followed the completion of the major renovation work undertaken on
the estate.
On August 11, 1969 the President, Ehrlichman, and Kalmbach
met in the President's office at the \'lesternWhite House. Kalmbach's
diary notes of that meeting state, "[President] was extremely
~c~plime~t~ry re the job that was done 0n the homesite and ..• [will]
host a reception from 6-7 p.m. on Tuesday afternoon. I'm to invite
3/
people largely responsible for the success of the project[,]"-' including
!!./
all government as well as non-governmental personnel.
This reception \-las held the following day and the President
expressed his appreciation to many of those attending on an individual
}_/
basis.
1:./ Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, "President
Nixon's Visits to the Hestern \\ThiteHouse, San Clemente, Cali-
forniall (Source: Agnes Waldron, Hhite House, August 28, 1973).
!:_/ Id.
1/ Herbert H. Kalmbach diary, August 11, 1969 (received from Water-
gate Special Prosecution Force).
!:!./ Herbert H. Kalmbach testimony, House Judiciary Committee July 17,
1974, transcript, 4830.
~/ Id.,. 4830-31; Inquiry staff Lntervi.ews of Ha thaway and Lynch.
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4. Alexander Butterfield has testified that the
President was livery interested in the grounds at Key Biscayne,
Camp David, San Clemente, the cottage, the house, the grounds
1/
1'- Kalmbach testified that there was "a great interest [by
the President] in all things relative to that [San Clemente] property,"
and related that on one occasion when he walked the San Clemente
grounds VlithPresident and Hrs. Nixon the President indicated that
!::_/
he wished the arrangement of various rose bushes to be changed.
The normal and more frequent procedure was for the President
to discuss the details of the work and operations at San Clemente
l/
with Ehrlichman or H. R. Haldeman, who would pass along instructions.
Kalmbach testified, "1 had a standard procedure to run all questions
Lclativ€ tv matters pertaining to San Clemente past Mr. EhrlichWilll
!!_/
and Mr. Haldeman for their approval and direction.
5. The President visited San Clemente from December 30,
2/
1969, to January 8, 1970.
1/ Alexander Butterfield testimony, House Judiciary Committee,
July 2, 1974 transcript, 2442.
2/ Herbert H. Kalmbach testimony, House Judiciary Committee,
July 17, 1974 transcript, 4824.
1/ Inquiry staff Ln tervLew of John Dean.
Ii/ lierbert I~. Kalmbach testimony, House Judiciary Cmmuittee,
July 17, 1974 transcript, 4827.
2/ Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, "President
Ni.xon IS Visits to the Hestern \\T11iteHouse, San Clemente, Ca1i-
f ornLa" (Source: Agnes Ha1dron, Hhite House, August 28, 1973).
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On January 15, 1970 Kalmbach talked to Ehrlichman by
1/telephone and it was agreed, apparently with the President's. assent,
that GSA should be given responsibility for the upkeep of the residence.
6. In total, the President spent 47 days at San Clemente
]j
in 1969, 53 days in 1970, 54 days in 1971 and 41 days in 1972.
7. In the February 28, 1973 tape recorded conversation
between the President and Dean, the following exchange occurred:
P. They can't get his [Kalmbach's] records with
regard to his private transactions?
D. No - that's privileged.
P. That's right.
D. Anything to do with San Clemente and the like -
that is just so far out of bounds.
P. Yeah. Did they ask for that?
D. No, no, no - No indication. 11
P. Good. Oh, well, even if it is [unintelligible]
8. On August 20, 1973 Coopers and Lybrand gave to
President and }frs.Nixon a specific breakdown of the amount and
!!j
manner of expenditure of their personal funds at San Clemente.
9. On December 8, 1973 the President announced his
intention to donate his San Clemente residence to the Nation after
51
his and }irs.Nixon's death.
11 See Inquiry staff report, pp. 61-63.
'!:_I Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, "President
Nixon's Visits to the h'estern fmite House, San Clemente,
California" (Source: Agnes Ha1dron, 1ffiiteHouse, August 28, 1973).
1/ "Transcripts of Eight Recorded Presidential Conversations,"
House Judiciary Con®ittee, Serial No. 34, }Iay-June, 1974, at p. 43.
il Statement on President and Hrs. Nixon's finances - January 1, 1969,
to Nay 31, 1973, Hhite House Press Release, December 8, 1973, 9
Presidential Documents llf38.
2./ President Nixon's statement, 111hiteHouse Press ReLease, December 8;
1973, 9 Presidential Documents 1413. [12295]
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Key Biscayne
-
1. The President spent 32 days at Key Biscayne in 1969,
1/34 days in 1970, 47 days in 1971, and 44 days in 1972.
2. In December 1968 the President personally designated
the type of fence which he wished to.surround the Key Biscayne
'!:j
compound.
3. Construction at the Key Biscayne compound was delayed
because of the President's April 2-6, 1969, visit there. GSA
documents reflect that during this time the President designated
i/
that certain landscape construction be undertaken.
4. On August 20, 1973 Coopers and Lybrand gave President
and Mrs.Nixon a specific breakdown on the amount and manner of the
!!_/
exper.df turc'of their personal fuadc vat Y.:eyBiscayne.
l/ Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, "President
Nixon's Visits to the Florida Hhite House, Key Biscayne, Florida"
(Source: Agnes Haldron, lfuiteHouse, August 28, 1973).
!:_/
1/
!!_/
See Inquiry staff report, pp. 71-72.
Id. at pp. 66-67.
Statement on President and Hrs. Nixon's finances - January 1, 1969
to May 31, 1973, 9 Presidential Documents 1438.
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B. Theories of the Evidence
1. Constitutional Theory
Article II, Section I of the Constitution provides in
part:
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for
his services, a Compensation, which shall neither be
increased nor diminished during the Period for which
he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive
within that Period any other Emolument from the
United States or any of them. II
2. Criminal Law
Title 18, §64l of the U. S. Code, entitled "Public money,
property or records," states:
Hhoever embezzles, steals, purLotns , or knowingly
converts to his use or the use of another, or
without authority, sells!conveys or disposes of
any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of
the United States or of any department or agency
thereof; or
Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same
wf.t.hintent to convert it to his use or gain, knowing
it to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined or con-
verted -
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both; but if the value
of such property does not exceed the sum of $100,
he shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
not more than one year, or both ...
II Black's Law Dictionary defines "emolument" as "any perquisite,
advantage, profit, or gain arising from the possession of an
office.t1
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c. Discussion
The fact that requests for a number of questionable
items or costs were initiated by the President personally or by
his representatives nmy be thought to support an argument that the
President was aware the Secret Service had not made an independent
professional judgment that such an item was necessary for security.
Ehrlichman's instructions given prior to the installation of some
±mprovements provide details as to what portions of those expenditures
he thought should be publicly financed (as we Ll, as displaying some
IIsensitivity to tax implications), and it can be argued that it is
unlikely that Ehrlichman did not discuss such personal financial
matters wf.th a President whom both Butterfield and Kalmbach described
') ,-,
as hlghly lnterested in the details ot operations at San Clelnen~e.
Finally, it can be argued that the effect of the President's announced
intention to donate San Clemente to the Federal government has
illusory impact on the emoluments issue, since (a) many of the
expenditures, such as landscape maintenance costs, can never be
recovered, and (b) the use and benefit of the "permanent" improvements
will continue to be enjoyed for some years by either the President
or his family (in some cases perhaps throughout the useful life of
the improvement).
II See Appendix A to Inquiry staff report.
']._I See supra pages 6-7. ·It should be noted that Ehrlichman has
never been intervie\ved in connection Vlith the Impeachment
Inquiry.
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On the other hand, it may be felt that most of these
expenditures-had a sufficiently plausible security purpose that
the President (himself not a technical security expert) would not
have been automatically alerted to any potential impropriety.
Moreover, even as to items that had no apparent security purpose, it
amounts to no more than speculation to say that the President was informed
at the time that payment for these items had come out of public
1:_/
The President's announced intentionrather than personal funds.
to donate his San Clemente property to the United States, after his
own and Mrs. Nixon's death, could be regarded as effecting a reim-
bursement of any emolument he might have received relative thereto.
More fundamentally, it may be thought that the duties and
circumstances of a modern President demand that a certain amount of
!:_/
protective benefit be conferred on his person by the government,
and that to impeach a modern President for receipt of such benefit,
,~thout a prior demonstration of public or national dissatisfaction
with the practice, would represent the imposition of a sanction for
breach of a standard of which he did not have fair notice.
1/ The Summary of Information states, at p. 3: liThe President knew
of the improvements as they were being made from his visits to
San Clemente and Key Biscayne; presumably he also knew that he
was not personally paying for them." (emphasis supplied)
!:_/ In this regard it should be noted that the GAO Report cited
significant nonprotective government eA~enditures in connection
with an airstrip located on the LBJ Ranch in Texas, including
$34,000 relating to alterations on President Johnson's airplane
hangar there. GAO Report, 87-88. Total expenditures in connection
'nth President Nixon's private properties total approximately
$17 million in comparison wLt h approximately $S. 9 million spent
in connection with President Johnson's private properties. See
Inquiry staff report, page 83.
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The arguments relevant to the legal theory of knowing
receipt of converted United States funds are largely the same as
those applicable to the Emoluments Clause, except that it would
also be necessary to demonstrate that the President had a criminal
intent to convert the public property in question to his own use.
The existence of such intent tends to be negated by the openness
with wh i ch the improvements were made; there is no suggestion of
the furtiveness commonly associated with conscious efforts to
embezzle or convert.
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TAX DEDUCTION FOR GIFT OF PAPERS
B. 1. Facts.
As stated by the Staff Report of the Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue Taxation, "Examination of President idxon' s Tax Returns
for 1969 through 1972":
On his tax return filed for 1969, President Nixon
claimed a deduction for a charitable contribution to the United
States. The tax return indicated that the gift consisted of per-
sonal papers, manuscripts, and other materials; that the date of
the gift was March 27, 1969; and that the value of the gift was
$576,000. The tax return also indicated that there were no
restrictions on the gift and that the gift was free and clear,
with no rights remaining in the taxpayer.
The amount of this gift alLowe d as a deduction in 1969
was $95,298. The deductions for this gift carried over and taken
in subsequent years [were ] as f oLl.ows: in 1970, $123,959; in
1971, $128,668; and in 1972, $134,093. Accordingly, the President
has taken deductions totaling $482,018. Since the gift is valued
at $576,000, presumably deductions of $93,982 remain for
subsequent years.
A deed for this gift of papers, dated March 27, 1969, was
delivered to the General Services Administration shortly after
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April 10; 1970. This deed was not signed by President Nixon
but rather by Edward L. Morgan, a deputy counsel to the President
who was on John Ehrlichman's staff. Questions have been raised
whether Mr. Morgan had the authority to sign the deed, whether
the deed was backdated, and also whether a deed was necessary
for this gift.
The President also made a gift of papers to the United
States in 1968. Since in 1968 the amount of the gift was in
excess of the maximum charitable contribution deduction availatle
in that year, a carryover was available to be used in future years,
but it has not been used because the amount of the charitable
contribution by the President in 1969 was large enough to account
for the maximum aLl.owab La charitable contributions through 1972.
In 1969, the Congress passed, and the President signed,
the Tax Reform Act of 1969 wh Lch contained amendments which,
in effect. repealed provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
allowing charitable contribution deductions for gifts of papers.
The 1969 Act repealed these provisions retroactively as of July 25,
1969, This had the effect of allowing a charitable contribution
deduction for gifts of papers if they were made on or before
July 25, 1969, but not if they were made after that date. The
question has arisen whether the gift of papers for wh Lch President
Nixon cLa ime d a deduction 'vas completed prior to July 25, 1969.
(Joint Co~~ittee Report, p. 9.)
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On December 7, 1973, the Internal Revenue Service formally
notified the President and 11r5. Nixon that their federal income tax
return for the years 1970, 1971 and 1972 would be reexamined. (P.JC,
Statement of Infornation, Book X, lIReport Respecting Deduction Taken
by the President for Years 1969 through 1972 for Gift of Papers Claimed
to be made on March 27, 196911 (hereafter lITax Reportll), Appendix 3.)
The next day the President made public a full accounting of his finan-
cial transactions since his assumption of office in 1969, including
hj,.sincome tax return for the years 1969-72, and he requested the
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation of the United States
Congress to examine certain items therein to deternine if they had
1/
been correctly reported.
The Joint Committee and the IRS thereafter conducted an'
examination of the President's returns, and concluded in part that the
President's deduction on the 1969 and subsequent returns of the gift of
pre-presidential papers should not be allowed. The IRS stated the issue
as follm"s:
Did the taxpayer make a completed gift of certain
pre-presidential papers to the United States between January 1,
1969 and July 25, 1969, so that he could avail himself of a
charitable deduction under section 170 of the Code? (IRS Audit
Report, Exhibit 1, p. 1.)
1/ The Summary of Information states, "only after the President learned
that the IRS was going to re-audit his returns did he request the
Joint CODJrJitteeon Internal Revenue Taxation to examine his deduction
for the gift of papers." (p. 11) It seems possible that if the matter
had not been referred to Congress, questions such as those raised in
the Summary of Information, concerning the thoroughness of the exal.lina-
tion conducted by personnel of the Executive branch, might have remained.
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The joint Committee concluded as follows:
The charitable deductions ($482,018) taken for gift
of papers from 1969-1972 should not, in the staff's view,
be allowed because the gift was made after July 25, 1969, the
date when the provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 dis-
allowing such deductions became effective. The staff believes
that in view of the restrictions and retained rights contained
in the deed of the gift of papers, that· the deed is necessary
for the gift. The deed (dated :Harch 27, 1969) which purportedly
was signed on April 21, 1969, was not signed (at least by all
parties) until April 10, 1970 and wa s not delivered until after
that date. It should also be noted that this deed was signed
by Edward Morgan (rather than the President), and the staff
found no evidence that he was authorized to sign for the President.
In addition, the deed stated that its delivery conveyed title to
the papers to the United States and since the deed was not
delivered until after April 10, 1970, it is clear that title
could not have been conveyed by ,.;rayof the deed until after
July 25, 1969. Furthermore, because the gift is so restricted,
in the opinion of the [Joint Corunittee) staff, it is a gift of a
future interest in tangible personal property, which is not deduc-
tible currently under the law, even if the gift wa s valid in all
other respects: that is, it had been Dade and the deed delivered
prior to July 25, 1969. (Joint Connittee Report, p , 5)
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The Joint Committee disavowed any attempt to "draw any conclu-
sions whether 'ther e"was, or was not, fraud or negligence involved in
any aspect of the returns, either on the part of the President or his
personal representatives." (Joint COlllnitteeReport, p. 4) This disa-
vo~va1 was predicated on the fact that this Committee was then involved
in an investigation of whe t.h er grounds exist for the impeachment of
the President.
The IRS, on the other hand, in the course of the investigation,
concluded that "inconsistencies abound[ed]" between the various stories
of the President's representatives involved in the gift of papers, 2~d
that a grand jury investigation "las war ran ted to determine whe the r fraud
had been comm i.t ted by these representatives. (Tax Report, Appendix n
l-lowpver_ ]ike the Joint Conunittee, the IRS made no allegations of fraud
against the President.
On April 2, 1974, the fraud investigation ~vas formally referred
to the Special Prosecutor in the naDes of three of the Presidentfs repre-
sentatives: Frank De...N1arco, his attorney; Ralph Newman , the appraiser of
the papers; and Edwa rd L. Morgan, formerly Deputy Counsel to the President.
(Tax Report, Appendix 8) The Special Prosecutor has recently begun a
grand jury investigation.
The evidence w i.t h respect to Presidential involvement is as
folloHs:
In a meeting betwe en then President-elect Nixon and President
Lyndon Johnson in 1968, President-elect Nixon bec~e aware of the possi-
bility of making a gift of his historical papers, and taking a charitable
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deduction on his federal income tax return for their fair market value.
-
(Tax Report, ns. 1 and 2) In mid-December, 1968 the President had dis-
cussions with Richard Ritzel, then his tax attorney, concerning the
feasibility and requireLlents of such a gift, and on Decer.lber27 or 28,
1968 he received from Ritzel 8'70 versions of the 1968 deed of gift and
a covering explanatory memorandum. (Tax Report, ns. 3-5) On the evening
of December 28, 1968, the President telephoned Mr. Ritzel, and they
discussed Ritzel's r.lemorandum and the restrictions on public access to
the papers contained in one or both deeds. (Tax Report, n. 6) Mr. Nixon
signed the 1968 deed, which was transmitted back to Mr. Ritzel, who then
completed arrangements for the 1968 gift. (Tax Report, n. 7) The Presi-
dent signed his 1968 tax return, Ivhich included a deduction of $70,552.00
for the 1968 ~ift. rTh e remaining $~ ,4L;;. 73 was made ava i.Labi.e db d
deduction carryover for future years. In accordance vlith IRS regulations,
a statement wa s attached to the return including infornation as to the
existence of any restrictions on the gift. It said in substance that
the gift was free and clear, w i.th no rights remaining in the taxpayer.
1/
(Tax Report, ns. 8, 9)-
On February 6, 1969, John Ehrlichman sent a memorandum to the
President in regard to gifts and charitable contributions. In this
memd.l:andum, Lhrlichnan recited the 1968 gift of papers, and suggested
that the President could continue to obtain the maximum charitable deduc-
tion of 30 percent of his adjusted gross income by first contributing to
1/ It may be argued that the facts in this paragraph indicate t~at the
P'resi rie nt ",'asinvolved in and wa s awa re of the requirer:ents and pro-
cedures for the 1968 gift of papers; and that the President had harl
experience of at least one method of executing a gift of his papers:
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charity procee~s !r~m the sale of the President's writing in an amount
equal to 20 percent of his adjusted gross income. With respect "to the
remaining 10;~)II Ehrlichrnan' s memorandum noted that it wou Ld "be made
up of a gift of your papers to the United States. In this Hay He
contemplate keeping the papers as a continuing reserve which we can use
from nOH on to supplement other gifts to add up to the 30% maximum."
There is a notation on the memorandum, apparently in the President's
hand",riting, which states "I. Good 2. Let me know what we can do on
the foundation idea-.tt There is no reference in this memorandum to
making a bulk gift of papers in the year 1969 which would be sufficient
for the President's 30 percent charitable deduction for 1969 and succeed-
ing years. (Tax Report, n.lO) On June 16, 1969, Ehrlichr:lan sent tHO
memoranda to Deputy Counsel Morgan dated June 16, 1969. One of these
memoranda mentioned the full 30 percent deduction for the 1969 tax year
and posed questions purportedly raised by the President himself in
1/
regard to his taxes. (Tax Report, n. 34)-
On November 7, 1969 Ralph Newman sent a preliminary appraisal
to the President, valuing the President's pre-Presidential papers at
slightly over DvO million dollars. (Tax Report, n. 38) On November 16,
1969 Newman attended a \;'hiteHouse prayer breakfast. Newman stated to
the staff at his Lrit.erv Lew that as he stood in the receiving line and
introduced himself to the President, he asked the President if he had
received the prelisinary appraisal. The President replied that he did
It may be argued that the facts in this paragraph are probative of
the proposition that the President did not have an intention in 1969
of making a b~lk ~ift of papers with car~yover consequences,
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receive the appraisal, and stated that he did not believe that the figure
could be so high. Newman told the President that the figure was a con-
II
servative estimate. (Tax Report, n. 39)
On December 30, 1969 the President signed the Tax Reform Act
])
of 1969. Th~s extrewely complex statute contair.ed a provision retro-
actively establishing a cut-off date of July 25, 1969 for effective
charitable donations of papers. (Tax Report, n. 45)
The final instance of Presidential involvemer.t in the events
leading to the gift of papers is the Pr~sident's signing of his 1969 tax
return on April 10, 1970. On that date, the President's attorney, Frank
DeHarco, met with the President and explained the tax return to him,
including the deduction for the gift of papers. Eerbert Kalmbach was
present at that meeting, and has testified before the Committee that the
1/
President and Dei"!arcowent over the return page by page and discussed
the tax consequences of the gift of papers deduction (Kalmbach testi.-
mony, 7/17/74, T 4864-65). In his Lnt arv Lew w i th the Staff, DeL'1arco
said that his explanation to the President consisted of D~'1arco's point-
ing to the appraisal by Newman and stating, IIThis, of course, is
1/ It may be argued that the facts in this paragraph are probative of
the proposition that, as of Novenber, 1969, the President did not
have an understanding that a gift of his papers had been Hade in
April of that year.
Based on the President's signature of this statute, which takes up more
than 300 pages in the U. S. Code Congressional and AC:':1inistrativeNeIVs,
the Sumriary of Information concludes, "There can be no doubt that the
President knew that the Tax Reform Act required that, for the cLaira of
a deduction to be valid, a gift l:1UStbe comp Le t ed by July 25, 1969. "
(Summa ry of Information, p. 2)
11 The statement that the gift had been made on March 27, 1969 was con-
taLned in an at t achtae n t to the return. (Summa ry of Lnf orraa t Lon , p. 1)
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the appraisal ~up~orting the deduction for the papers which you gave
away." According to DePillrco, the President's response wa s "That's
fine." DeMarco has said there was no discussion about the deed giving
the gift of papers to the United States. DeMarco told the President
that the gift of papers would be a tax shelter for several years.
DeHarco has stated that there \Vas no in-depth analysis of the tax
return while he was with the President, but he said there was no
question that the President knew he was getting a refund and that a
basis for the refund was the deduction taken for the gift of papers.
Shortly thereafter, DeHarco met with Hrs. Nixon and obtained her
signature on the return. (Tax Report, n. 68)
2. Theories of the Evidence.
The Minority staff submit that the issue with respect to the
President's taxes is not whether the deduction for the gift of papers
1/
was valid or invalid. Nor is the issue whether any personal represen-
tative of the President committed fraud in connection with the gift of
President committed acts constituting "lVillful tax evasion.
papers or the preparation of the return. The prLriary issue is whe t her the
]j
Section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code, entitled "Attempt
to Evade or Defeat Tax,'" provides:
1/
Under applicable Law , the burden of est ab lishing the validity of
the deduction falls upon the President. The burden of proof in this
Inquiry is not with the President.
]j
As the SUDUl1aryof Information states, "Here mistake or negligence
by the President in filing false tax re~urns would clearly not
provide grounds for Lmpe achmen t ;." (S~mmary of Informatio;, pp. 3-4)
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Any person who wi Ll fuLjy attempts in any manner
to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or
the payment thereof shall, in addition to other
penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and,
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$10,000.00, or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both, together with cost.of prosecution.
3. Discussion.
In order to establish a case of willful tax evasion under
Section 7201, there must be proof not only of willfulness on the part
of the taxpayer, but also of affirmative acts of wron gdoLrig, such as
c:Ieceit,concealment, misrepresentation, and the other usual "badges
of fraud." In Spies v. United State~, 317 U. S. 492 (1943),the
Suprene Court stated:
By way of illustration, and not by way of limitation,
we would think a f f Lrma t i.vewillful attempt may be
inferred from conduct such as keeping a double set of
books, making false entries or alterations, or false
invoices or documents, destruction of books or records,
concealment of assets or covering up sources of income,
handling of one's affairs to avoid naking the records usual
in transactions of the kind, and any conduct, the likely
effect of which would be to mislead or to conceal ..
Other cases are instructive on the character of acts necessary
to constitute fraudulent deductions. Such fraudulent deductions include
the fraudulent taking of unjustified deductions based on false inven-
tory, Un:!:_tedStates v , Kelley, 105 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1939); the claiming
of extensive deductions for losses on sales of securities where the
securities were sold to close friends at "bargain prices" and very
shortly bought back by the taxpayer, United States V. Schenck, 126 F.2d
702 (2d Cir. 1942)~ert_. denied su_1::_.norr. ~los~O\v~ V. United States.,
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316 U.S. 705 (1942); and the cl~imine of a loan made by the taxpayer
and taken as a deduction for "purchases," thus reducing income,
BarshoE. v. United-States, 192 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1951), cert deniee!,
342 U.S. 920 (1952).
It may be argued tha~ the 1970 events reveal affirmative
acts of wrongdoing on the part of the President's personal representatives,
1/
Newman , DeMarco and/or Morgan. Howe ver , it is difficult to see how the
President could be charged w i t.h willfulness or with an affirmative act of
wrongdoing unless he knew of any fraudulent acts by his personal represen-
tatives. The evidence does not seem to bear out Presidential knowledge
of fraudulent acts by his subordinates in connection with his tax rsturns.
On the one hand, it can be argued that it is doubtful that
DeMarco, Newman and Horgan would undertake a coordinated scheme of
falsification on their 0,,'Tl without checking w i t.hthe taxpayer or one
of his close advisors. The gift of papers was of enormous importance
to the President's financial posture and was also of some historical
significance. The three men involved herein we re not customarily handling
personal affairs of the President of such magnitude without some guidance.
The President has stated that he relied on his lmvyer, tax accountant,
and other subordinates to handle the gift. A h'hite House press state-
ment dated April 4, 1974 states that any errors cODffilittedby the President's
tax consultants were done without the President's approval.
The Summary of Information does not address this issue. Good faith
reliance on one's attorney is a defense to the crininal charge. Reliance
is a factual issue to be determined by a finder of ract. In a crininal
trial if the defendant raises the defense that he relied on someone else
to prepare the return, he is entitled to an instruction on that issue,
since the doctrine of respondeat superior applicable to a civil case
would not apply in a criminal case. It should appear from the circum-
stances that the advisor had an apparent competence in the tax field.
In addition there must be a showing that the taxpayer actually believed
and followed the advice.
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In addition, '."hen the President signed his 1969 tax return, he knew
that he had signed a deed in connection with the 1968 gift: and yet
he had signed no deed for the 1969 gift -- althou~h since assuming
the Presidency in January, 1969, the President had probably grown
more accustomed to acting through agents in his personal affairs.
The short answer to the case of i;"puted -knmvlecfgeand
inferred intent upon which any fraud allegations wouLd have to rest
in this instance, is that the mer e fact that a taxpayer has signed his
tax return is not enough. If the burden is on the ComrJittee to
establish the eLernen t s of Presidential fraud, that burden simply is
not carried by the evidence recited above, which falls far short of
demonstrating pn the part of the President, any act of deceit, con-
cealment, rif.sr epte sentatLon, or the other usual "badges of fraud."
Although the ComnLt t ee and staff have Lnter vi ewed two of the parti-
cipants in the meeting of April 10, 1970 at which the President
signed his 1969 tax return, neither witness stated that the President
'\'T2S informed or even asked about the details of the gift. Indeed,
none of the witn~sses in the case interviewed by the staff has indi-
cated that the President had any awar eriess of the details of the
1/
circumstances surrounding the gift of papers.
}j In regard to the absence of evidence of Presidential knowl edge ,
the failure of the staff to submit interrogatories to the Presi-
dent must weigh heavily in considering whether the Committee is
acting on a complete record. Such written questions can be
nar r owl y dr awn to elicit nar r ow responses, as the Lnt er r oga t or i.e s
drafted by the Joint Committee dernonst r at e . The President has
indicated that he would submit written responses under oath to
such interrogatories if submi t ted by this Committee, but to date
el~ Committee has not seen fit to avail itself of that oppor t un lty .
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The Sumrr.aryof Information argues that willfulness and know Ledge
"may be inferred from all the events and circumstances surrounding
the making of the gift and the preparation and execution of the tax
return." (Summary of Infonnation, p . 4) Hillfulness and knowledge
on the pa~~'of the President cannot be inferred merely from the evi-
dence before this Committee concerning essentially the acts of other
individuals.
[12314]
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INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
A. Facts
The following discussion concerns whether the President has
commf.t.t ed acts of abuse of powe r in connection w.i t.h the misuse of the
Internal Revenue Service by obtaining confidential tax information from
the IRS, and endeavoring to have the IRS initiate or accelerate investi-
gation of taxpayers.
1. Report on Gerald Wallace Investigation
On or about }larch 21, 1970; Special Counsel to the President
Clark Hollenhoff transmitted to H. R. Haldeman material obtained by
Hollenhoff from the IRS and dealing wf.t h the taxes of Governor George
lvallace's brother, Gerald Hallace. (Book VIII, p. 35) Hollenhoff had
been instructed by Haldeman to obtain a report from the IRS on an investi-
gation relating to Governor George Wallace and Gerald Wallace, on assurances
by Haldeman that the report was to be obtained at the request of the Pres i-
dent. Hollenhoff states that he neither gave copies to anyone else nor
discussed the substance of it with anyone else until after the appearance
of a news article on April 13, 1970, that described confidential field re-
po rt s and the IRS IS inves tiga tion of charges of corrup tion in the lvallace
Administration and the activities of Gerald "'allace. (Book VIII, pp. 38-39).
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Former Cormnissioner of Internal Revenue Randolph Thrmver
has stated that an IRS investigation of the leak of information
concluded that the material had not been leaked by the IRS or the
Treasury Department. In an affidavit submitted to the Committee,
Thrower has also stated that thereafter he and the IRS Chief Counsel
met with Haldeman and Ehrlichman at the Hhite House and discussed with
tHem the seriousness of the leak and the fact that unauthorized dis-
closure of IRS information constituted a criminal act. Neither
Haldeman nor Ehrlichman indicated to Thrower the source of the leak,
but they did appear to take the complaint seriously and assured Thrower
that they would cooperate in undertaking to prevent such incidents in
the future. Further, Haldeman and Ehrlichman assured Throwe.r that they
wou Ld call the gravity of the situation to the attention of those in
the Hhite House who might from time to time have access to such
information. (Book VIII, pp. 40-42)
2. E~e~ies List
In an affidavit submitted to the Committee, Johnnie Halters,
former IRS Commissioner, has stated that on September 11, 1972, at Dean's
request, he went to Joh~ Dean's office where he received from Dean a list of
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McGovern staff members and campaign contributors. Dean requested that
the IRS begin investigations or examinations of the individuals named
on the list. Dean said he had not been asked by the President to have
this done, and that he did not know whether the President had asked this action
to be undertaken. (Book VIII, p. 240) Walters advised Dean that compliance
with such a request would be disastrous for the IRS and the Administration --
"would make the Watergate affair look like a 'Sunday school picnic'" --
and that he intended to discuss the matter with Secretary of the Treasury
George Shultz and recommend to Shultz that nothing be done on the request.
'(Book VIII, pp. 275-79) Dean has testified that he was instructed to give
this list to Walters by either Murray Chotiner or John Ehrlichman. Dean
testified that he learned that Chotiner had collected the names of all the
prinripal contributors in the McGovern campaign from which a list of names
would be compiled that Dean would in turn submit to Walters for IRS audits.
(Dean iestimony, HJCT pp. 3522-23)
On September 13, 1972 Walters showed Shultz the list and advised
him that he believed they should not comply 'vith Dean's request to commence
examination or investigation of the people named on the list. Shultz told
Halters to do nothing with respect to the list and Walters put it in his
office safe. (Book VIII, pp. 275-79)
On September IS! 1972, during a conversation with the President,
Haldeman mentioned, among other things, "Dean working through the IRS." The
transcript prepared by the Inquiry staff reflects the following exchange:
PRESIDENT:
HALDE~'fAN:
[Unin teLl.LgLbLe J
John, he is one of the quiet guys that
gets a lot done. That was a good move,
too, bringing Dean in. But it's --
PRESIDENT: Yeah.
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It -~ He'll never, he'll never gain any
ground for us. He's just not that kind
a guy. But, he's the tind that enahles
other people to gain ground while he's
making sure that you don't fall through
the holes.
Oh. You mean
Betvleen times, he's doing, he's moving
ruthlessly on the investigation of McGovern
people, Kennedy stuff, and all that too. I
jus t don't know hov much < progress he's
making, 'cause I --
The problem is that's kind of hard to find.
Chuck, Chuck has gone through, you knoH, has
worked on the list, and Dean's working the,
the thing through IRS and, uh, in some cases,
I think, some other [unintelligible] things.
He's -- He turn~d out to be tougher than I
thought he woulJ, which is what
Yeah. (HJCT 1)
Soon thereafter Dean entered the Room. Dean has testified
that in the last seventeen minutes of that meeting, he, the President
1/and Haldeman discussed the use of the IRS. (Dean testimony, Trans-
cript, pp. 3522-24) As Dean recalled the conversation, they talked
about the problem of having the IRS conduct audits; Dean told the
1/ On Hay 28, 1974 the ~.Jatergate Special Prosecutor moved that the
recording of the last portion of this meeting be turned over to
t~e appropriate grand jury because that recording was relevant to
the alleged Imi te House attempts to abuse and politicize the IRS,
including unLawf ully attempting in August and September 1972 to
instigate an IRS investigation of O'Brien. OQ July 12, 1974 Judge
Sirica granted the motion and ordered that the recording of the
conversation from 6:00,to approximately 6:13 p.m. be made available
to the Special Prosecutor. The order was stayed pending appeal by
the President. (Book VIII, pp. 3LI0-49)' On June 24, 1972 the
Committee subpoenaed tapes, dictabelts, memoranda and other records
of the conversatjons. Such J:1aterialshave not yet heen furnished
to the Cornnri,t;t ee •
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President and Haldeman of his difficulty in getting Walters-to
commence audits; and the President complained that Shultz had not
been sufficiently responsive to vJhite House requirements.
testimony, HJCT pp. 3523-24; Book VIII, pp. 334-36)
On or about September 25, 1972, Dean telephoned lvalters
(Dean
and inquired as to the progress regarding the list of McGovern
campaign workers and contributors. Walters informed Dean that no
progress had been made. Dean asked if it might be possible to
develop information on 50, 60 or 70 of-the names, and Walters res-
ponded that, although he would reconsider the matter with Secretary
Shultz, any activity of this type would be inviting disaster. On
September 29th, l.valtersdiscussed Dean's request ",ith Shultz and
th~y agreed that nothing be done with respect to the list.
Thereafter, there "ere no further discussions by Walters about this
matter during his tenure as IRS Commissioner and no actions we re
taken by the IRS in regard to the list. (Book VIII, p. 274-79)
On July 11, 1973, Walters turned the list over to the
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation. On December 20, 1973,
the staff of the Joint Committee issued a report stating that it
found no evidence that the returns of any persons on the list were
screened as a result of lvhite House pressure. (Book VIII, pp. 280-85)
3. Investigation of Lawr en co 0' Brien
During the summer of 1972, Commissioner hTalters was
asked by Secretary Shult~ to check on a report by Ehrlichman that
Democratic National Committee Chairman LaHrence O'Brien
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had received large amounts of income wh Lch might not have be en reported
properly. Ehrlichman had received a sensitive case report on the O'Brien
investigation sometime earlier and had asked Roger Barth, Assistant to the
IRS Commissioner, to check O'Brien's tax returns. Barth did so and reported
to Ehrlidunan that the returns seemed' in order. (Book VIII, pp. 223-25;
Barth testimony, SSC Exec. Sess., June 5, 1974) Halters reported to
Shultz on the IRS's examination of O'Brien's returns for 1970 and 1971,
and later learned from Shultz that Ehrlichman was not satisfied with
the report on the status of O'Brien's returns. Because of Ehrlichman's
inquiries, O'Brien was interviewed during the summer of 1972, although
it was generally the IRS's policy to postpone investigations involving
sensitive cases, to the extent possihle without loss of position or
revenue, until after the election. A copy of the taxpayer conference
report was submitted to Shultz. (Book VIII, pp. 217-25)
A short time thereafter Shultz informed Halters that Ehrlichman
was not satisfied and that he desired further information about the
matter. Ehrlichman has testified that he called Shultz to complain
that the IRS ,vas delaying the audit until after the election. Ehrlichman
told Shultz of his concern that the IRS bureaucracy, in its timing of
audits, might be moving more quickly on Republicans than Democrats.
(Book VIII, pp. 224-25) Halters advised Shultz that the IRS had
checked the filing of the return and the examination status of those
returns, which were closed, and that there was nothing else the IRS
could do. (Book VIII, pp. 217-27)
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On or ab9ut August 29, 1972, at the request of Shultz,
Walters went to Shultz's office with Barth to conclude the review
of the O'Brien matter. The three discussed the matter and agreed
that the IRS could do no more,. and thereafter they jointly telephoned
Ehrlichman. Shultz and Halters informed Ehrlichman that the IRS had
verified that O'Brien had filed returns which reflected large amounts
of income, that the IRS had already examined and closed their returns,
and that the three were all agreed that ther-e was nothing further
that the IRS could do. Ehrlichman indicated disappoint~ent and said
to I'laltersthat he was "goddanID tiTed of his foo t -dr aaz Lnz tactics."
(Book VIII, pp. 227--35)
Haldeman and Dean have testified that during their
September l5, 1972 meeting wI th the President there was a discussion
of taking· steps to overcome the umlillingness of the IRS to folloH
l/ (Bookup on complaints. VIII, pD. 333-36) Ac co r din <:; to an affidavit
by SSC Minority Counsel Fred Thompson, J. Fred Buzhardt, Special Counsel
to the President, has stated that during the September 15, 1972 ~eetillg
Dean reported on the IRS investigation of Lawrence O'Brien. (Book VIII,
pp. 337-39)
1.1 Both this Committee and the Special Prosecutor have attempted
to obtain a tape of the last 17 minutes of this conversation.
See footnote 1, S\.wYa, p . 4.
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4. Other Tax Information
The Summary of Information briefly adverts to a number of
instances in which a member of Dean's staff obtained confidential
information and attempted to have audits performed on certain indi-
viduals. There is no competent evidence of Presidential knowledge of,
1/
or involvement in, any of these cases, although there is an apparent
reference to securing information from the IRS in the transcript of the
conversation between John Dean and the President on March 13, 1973:
PRESIDENT: Do you, need any IRS [unintelligible] stuff?
DEAt'l': Uh Not at the
***
0EAN: . Uh, ~here is no need at this nour
for anything from IRS, and we have a couple
of sources over there that I can go to. I
don't have to fool around with Johnnie Walters
or anybody, we can get right in and get wh at
He'need. (HJCT 50)
]j
Dean's Executive Session testimonv before the Senate Select Committee
(Book VIII, p. 154) suggests that'the President wanted the IRS "turned,
off on friends of his." A subsequent staff .in t erv i ew 'vith Dean has
indicated that Dean learned of this not from the President, but from
Higby.
».»
.' .
-'
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B. Discussion
Many of the alleged instances of IRS abuse, e.g., the
1/Gerald Wallace case, are very weak in terms of Presidential know.l.edge ,
With respect to the O'Brien investigation, the evidence in hand does
not shm" that the President urged or ordered Ehrlichman to obtain tax
information on O'Brien, or to encourage an audit of his taxes. There
is a suggestion of Presidential knowledge of. those activities, however,
in the affidavit of Fred Thompson, Minority Counsel to the SSC, in
I which Thompson states that J. Fred Buzhardt had informed him that the
September 15, 1972 conversation between the President and Dean con-
]j
cerned a report by Dean on the tax investigation of O'Brien.
The Enemies List is a stronger case for Presidential know-
ledge. The tape in the possession of the Comm.it t ee shows that Haldeman
informed the President that Dean was mov Lng "ruthlessly" on the
investigation of HcGovern people, and working the "thing" through
the IRS. Dean's testimony indicates that the President urged him to
use the IRS to conduct audits, and that Dean thereafter contacted
Johnnie Walters a second time to ask if there had been any action on
1/
A potentially applicable criminal statute is 26 U.S.C. § 7213 which
prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of tax information by any
officer or employee of the United States.
2/
A criminal statute which might apply to this situation is 26 U.S.C.
§ 7212, entitled "Attempts to interfere with administration of
internal reveuu e Laws i " Howe'ver , this statute is usually applied
to persons who attempt to prevent the execution of the Revenue Code.
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the list of McGoverri staff and contributors that he had giv~n Walters
several days earlier.
Even if the President did not instruct Dean to go back to
Walters, if he had knowledge of any attempt to use the IRS for political
purposes, acquiescence would appear indefensible. If it is believed
that the President knew of or encouraged Dean's activities w Lth respect
to the IRS, perhaps the best that can be said is that a minute exami-
nAtion of five years of any President's tenure, involving hundreds of
thousands of gove rnmen tal decisions, wou l.d probably reveal a certain
irreducible minimum of error. Hithout in any way attempting to
justify or excuse an isolated or limited example of misuse of a
government agency, it may yet be suggested that one or two, or even
three or four such examples in the course of five years, do not
establish a "pattern" of gross abuse of powe r sufficient to war ran t
the removal of a President. In the heat of politics, it may be that
men make errors of the heart as ~vell as of the head; but perhaps the
fact that the context is political should not rule out the possibility
of a locus. poeni tentiae.
[12325]
"[12326]
II.
HATERGATE CASE
A. Criminal Lmv Analysis
The June 5, 1972 Grand Jury of the United States District
Court for the Distric t of CoLumbLa voted on February 25, 197f.., to
name Richard H. Nixon, President of the United States~ as an unindicted
member of the conspiracy to defra~d the United States and to obstruct
justice charged in Count I of the indictment returned by that Grand
Jury on March 1, 1974, in the case of United States v. Hitchell, et al.
Simultaneously "dth the issuance of this indictment, the Grand Jury
filed with the c.ourta Report and Recommendation requesting that cer-
tain evidentiary materials obtained by the Grand Jury in the course of
its investigation of the circumstances surrounding the VJatergate
burglary be fan-larded to the Committee 011 the Judiciary of the House
of Representatives. On March 26, 1974, by order of Ch.iefJudge John
J. Sirica, the Report and Recommendation and accompanying evidentiary
materials were conveyed to the Committee pursuant to the Grand Jury's
request.
The action of the Grand Jury served to sharpen what had
already become a central question of this lmpeaclunent Inquiry~
11
J)
Gr. No. 74-110
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Did the )?resident, at any time between June 17, 1972
and the present day, become a knowing and intentional
participant in a criminal conspiracy to obstruct
justice in connection with the official investigation
of the Watergate break-in?
Law of Conspiracy: General
Essentially, a criminal conspiracy is a combination, con--
cert, or agreement of two or more individuals for the purpose of com-
mitting a criminal act, or to do a Lawf uI act by criminal or un LawfuL
'!:_I
means,
It is generally accepted by the federal courts that circum-
stantial evidence may be used to establish the existence of a con-
spiratorial agreement, particularly since such an agreement, by its
very nature, is characteriz~d by secrecy, and therefore rarely is there
11direct evidence establishing the existence of a conspiracy. No par=
ticular form of agreement or express assent is required to constitute
a criminal conspiracy under is U. s. C:' §371, as long as the necessary PU1:'-
pose of the agreement is the commission of some federal offense, even
though all the elements of the substantive offense are not covered by
II
,Pettibone v. U.S., 148 U.S. 197, 203; U.S. v. Perlstein, 126 F.2d
789, certiora~denied, 316 U.S. 678.
11
"Ingram v. U.S., 360 U.S. 672; Blumenthal v. U.S., 332 U.S. 539,
557; Baker v. U.S., 329 F.2d, 786, certiorari denied, 379 U.S.
853; U.S. v. ~~twak, .195 F.2d, 748, 753, affld, 344 U.S. 604;
U.S. v. Nack, 112 F.2d 290.
[12328]
-3-
!!_/
.Itwell established that a "tacit undarstandLng" asthe agreem.ent.
demonstrated by a certain course of conduct is sufficient to establish
~/
an agreement.
§_/
A conspiracy may be deduced from the conduct of the
parties.
It is not necessary to prove that a particular defendant was
aware of all the aims of the conspiracy or of the identity of all its
participants. The r equf.sLt;e agreernen.tmay exis t without kno~"ler1!?:.eon
the part of all the conspirators of all the details of the conspiracy. 7/
or of the identity of all the co-conspirators.- To convict one as a
conspirator, however, it is necessary to show that he knew or und er+
stood the essential nature or the purpose of the conspiracy, and that
he intended to violate the criminal statute or commit the substantive
8/
crime which was the object of the conspiracy.- Furthermore, the
!!_/ u.s, v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 892, certiorari denied, 401 U.S.
924; u.s. v. Tuffanelli, 131 F.2d 890, certiorari denied, 318 U.S.
772.
~/ Direct Sales Co. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 703, 714.
§_/
Babb v. U.S., 27 F.2d 80, certiorari denied, 278 U.S. 624.
2/ Blumenthal v . U.S., 332 U.S. 539, 557; U.S. v. Projansky , 465 F.2d
123, 135, certiorari denied, 409 U.S. 1006; U~. v , Agueci, 310
f.2d 817, 826, certiorari denied, 372 U.S. 959. '
.S_! U.S. v. Cardi, 478 F.2d 1362; Miller v. U.S., 382 F.2d 533,
Certiorar:id~nied, 390 U.S. 984; U.s. v.Sneiner, 273 F. Supp .
977, aff'c!LflOF:2d 337, certiorartdcnied, 396 U.S. 825; U.S.
v. Gisenhaltz, 278 F. Supp. 434. .
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requisite criminal. intent must be at least of the degree of criminal
intent which would be necessary to sustain a conviction for the sub":"'
2/ It has been held that a critical inquirystantive offense itself.
in any conspiracy case involves a determination of the kind of agree-
ment or understanding that existed as to each defendant as he understood
}!}_/
it.
It should be noted that 18 U.S.C. §371, relating to con-
spiracies to lldefraud the United Statesi' or any agency thereof, in any
manner or for any purpose, is not confined to fraud as that term had
been used in the common 1aw , and it reaches any conspiracy for the
purpose of impairing, obstructing, or defeating any lawful governmental
11/
function by.deceit, craft or trickery, or by means which are dishonest.
Neither pecuniary loss to the United States nor receipt of considera-
tion is essential to a finding of a violation of Section 371 relating
~./
to conspiracy to defraud the United States.
The conspiratorial agreement is a crime in itself under 18
U,S.C. §371, independent of the cOlumission of the particular offense
2/ Ingram v. U.S., 360 U.S. 672; Carter v. U.S., 333 :F.2d 354.
10/
U.S. v. Cirillo, 468 :F.2d 1233, certiorari denie~, 410 U.S. 989.
,
Dennis v. U.S., 384 U.S. 855; U.S. v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169;
U.S. v. Sw;rg, 316 F~ Supp. 1148~
U.S. v. Pclg, 433 F. 2d 48, certiorari denied, 401 U.S. 955.
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wh i.ch is the object of the conspiracy. Since the gravamen of the crime
of conspiracy is the agreement, the substantive crime itself need not
)2/
be effectuated. However, Section 371 requires an "act to effect
the object of the conspiracyll. Thus, the unlawful plan or agreement
must be followed by at least one overt act or some conduct in further-
ance of the plan or agreement, before there can be a maturation of the
14/
crime of conspiracy. The overt qct need not be a criminal act; it
may be an act of preparation, and it need be done by only one of the
l,}j
conspirators.
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the elements of a
criminal conspiracy include:
1) a. cr tmf.nal obj ective to be accomplished, or a lawful
objective to be accomplished by criminal means;
2) some form of an agreement or understanding between
two or more individuals whe reby they become definitely
com..mf.t t ed to cooperate for the attainment of the
objective pursuant to an express or implied plan or
scheme embodying the means for its attainment (or
by any effective means);
3) knowledge or understanding by participating conspir-
ators of the nature or purpose of the conspiracy and
a criminal intent to violate the criminal statute or
commit the substantive offense which is the object of
the conspiracy; and
J:lj
Ca Llanan v , p.S., 364 U.S. 587, 593; Pinl:erton v. U.S., 328 U.S.
6L!O, !1L~3. '
14/ u.s. v. Skillman, 442 F.2d 542, 547, certiorari denied, 404 U.S.
833; Cro~s v. U.S., 392 F.2d 360.
15/.,...,.... Braverman v. U.S., 317 U.S. 49, 53.
[12331]
-6-
4) an overt act in furtherance of the objective of the
conspiracy. 1j_/
Once a conspiracy becomes "compLete" with the commission of
the first overt act, in the sense that the word is ordinarily used to
represent the establishment of a conspiracy, it continues in existence
until the final objective of the conspiracy is accomplished or until
1:7/
there is shown some affirmative act of abandonment or tennination.
Joining an Ongoing Conspiracx
One need not be a member of a conspiracy fr-omits inception,
18/
but can join a continuing conspiracy at any time. Those who join
a conspiracy during its progress and cooperate in the COlWloneffort to
obtain the unlawful results become parties thereto and.assume responsi.,..
bi1ity for all preceding acts in furtherance of the scheme , as weLl,as
19/
subsequent acts, As in the case of an original cons:piracy~ it is
not essential that the individual joining an existing conspiracy have
M_/
Pinkerton v. ~~., 145 F.2d 252; ~. v. Bostic, 480 F.2d
965; U. S. v. Guterma, 189 F. Supp. 265.
III u. S. v. Perlstein, 126 F.2d 789, certiorari denied, 316 U. S.
678; Nyguist v. y~~., 2 F.2d 504, certiorari~~ied, 267 ~. S.
606.
~/ Phe~ v. ~., 160 F.2d 858; certiorari denied, 396 U. S. 1060;u. s. v. Lester, 282 F.2d 750; U. S. v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316.
19/
Lefco v. ~., 74 F.2d 66.
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knowledge of all the details of the conspiracy, nor even of the identity
'l!))
of all his co~conspirators.· ,
~wledge and Intent
CrIm.inaL conspiracy involves more than a general ~~~:
211
a showing of specific intent is required.
221
Mere association with the
conspirators is not enough.
-, Nor is mere knowledge of the criminal
aspects of the enterprise sufficient, even though knowledge must be
?}_I
shown.
In addition to proof of actual knowledge, there must be a
24 1
showdrig of an "Lnt ent;to participate. n- To establish membership in
an ongoing conspiracy, it must be demonstrated (either thr:ough direct
or circumstantial evidence) that the individual had knowledge of the
conspiracy, and in some fashion contributed his efforts, participated
in an act in furtherance of the conspiracy, or otherwise manifested his
~I u.s. v. Bolin, 423 F.2d 834; U.S. v. Thomas, 468 F.2d 442, certiorari
'-denied, 410 U.S. 935; U.S. v.CiJdni, 427 F.2d 129, certiorari
~~, 400 U.S. 911.
21;
- 1!,?YHQodv. U.S., 232 F.2d 220,225, certiorari denied, 351 U.S.
982 (1956); U.S. v. ~ack, 112 F.2d 290, 292 (1940).
2_3:_1
U.S, v , Stro~~~~, 268 F.2d 256 (1959); Dennis v. U.S., 302 F.2d
512 (1962); u.s. v. Steele, 469, F.2d 165,168- (1972). '
2}_1
Thon~ v , U.S., 57 F.2d 1039,1042 (1932).
24 1-. U,S. v.Avi1es, 274 F.2d 179, 189 (1959), certiorari deniei, 362
U.S. 974(i960).
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22)
his intent to participate.· The defendant must in some sense promote
2.£_/
the venture himself1 make it his own, have a stake in the outcome.
There must be some affirmative action, but a single act may be sufficient
')Lj
to dra\Van individual within the ambit of conspiracy.
In order to determine the President's criminal liab:Uity
according to the law of conspiracy, as of any given moment th time~
the Committee must determine whether the President has I by any affirma-
tive action, including words, manifested an intent to associate himself
with others in an enterprise whose criminal purpose is known to him.
Duty to Act
There is a line of cases suggesting that one who has an
official duty to act to prevent the achievement of the aims of a criminal
conspiracy may be liable as a co-conspirator if he learns of the
25/
Nassif v. U.S., 370 F.2d 147, 152 (1966).
2J!
'--'U,.S. v , Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, aff'd, 311 U.S. 205 (1940). This
"stake in the outcome" or "stake in the venture" test applied in
Falcone has been utilized by some courts to establish the requi-
site specific intent. The test has been particularly popular with
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. However, it has not won.
universal acceptance. See: Direct Sales Co. v. United States,
supra; United States v. Tl_."_~.21:aglino,19-7F.2d 928,-9"30 (1952);
Johns v. United States, 195 F.2d 77,79-80 (1952): 72 Harv. L. Rev.
920, 931 (1959).
27(
U.S. v. Carminati, 247 F.2d 6LI01 certiorari denied, 355 U.S. 883
(1957); U.S. v , Aviles, supra.
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!:!ifconspiracy but fails to act to thwart it. In each of these cases,
the criminal liability of a law enforcement officer was at issue; in
Jezewski (see fn. 28), the conviction of a mayor was also upheld.
It is important to note, however, that even under the
Burkhardt analysis (see fn. 28), the intent to participate must be
proved. The officer ,,1111not be held criminally liable for his own
inaction unless it is proved that his failure to act did not stem from
mere indecision or from some innocent motive but was intended by him
to be his contribution to the success of the conspiracy.
Based partly on the Burkhardt principle, the Model Penal
Code of the American Law Institute includes a provision for criminal
liability predicated upon failure to perform a legal duty to prevent
crime:
. • • (3) A person is an accomplice of another person
in the commission of an offense if:
(a) with the purpose of promoting or
facilitating the commission of the offense~
he ..•
(iii) having a legal duty to prevent
the commission of the offense, fails
to make proper effort t~ do so .. ~ •
(Section 2.06 (3) (a) (iii) of the Model Penal Code (1962).)
~.
.28/
U.S. v. Burkhardt, 13 F.2d 8U (6th Cir. 1926); Jezevski V. U.S.,
13 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1926); Lutheran v. JI.JL.., 93 F.2d 395, /100
(8th Cir., 1937), cert denied, 303 U.S. 644, reh. denied, 303 U.S.668. -----
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Obstruction of Justice Statutes
a. Title 18, U,S. Code~ 11503 provides:
Influencing or lnluring officer, juror or
witness generally.
~VllOevercorruptly, or by threats of force, or
.by any threatening letter or communication, end~avors
to influence, intimidate, or impede any wLt.ness , in
any court of the United States or before any United
States magistrate or other committing magistrate, or
any grand or petit jury, or officer in or of any, court
of the United States, or officer who may be serving
at any examination or other proceedinE before any
United States magistrate or other committing magistrate,
in the discharge of his duty, or injures any part or
witness in his person or' property, on account of his
attending or having attended such court or examination
before such officer, magistrate, or other committing
magistrate or on account of his testifying or having
testified to any patter pending therein, or injures
any such grand or petit juror in his person or property
on account of any cerdict or indictment assented to
by him, or on account of his being or having been such
juror, or injures any such officer, magistrate, or
other commf.tt Lng magistrate in his person or property
on account of the performance of his official duties,
or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threat-
ening letter or communication influences, obstructs,
or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or
impede, the due administration of justice, shall be
fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
b. Title 18, U.S. Code, §1505, provides:
Obstruction of proceedings be!ore departments,
agencies, and conunittees.
7,.
, '
vmoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by
any threatening letter or conrrnunication, endeavors t~
influence, intimidate, or impede any witness in any pro-
ceeding pending before any department or agency of the
United States, or in connection with any inquiry or
investigation being had by either House, or any com-
mittee of either House, or any joint comnu t tee of the
Congress; or
[12336]
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Whoever injures any party or w.i tne ss in his
person or property on account of his attendirig or
having attended such proceedingl inquiry, or inves-
tigation, or on account of his testifying or having
testified to any matter pending therein; or
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or
by any threatening letter or conununication influences,
obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, .
obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration
of the law under wh i.ch such proceeding is being had
before such department or agency of the United States,
or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry
under which such inquiry or investigation is being had
by either House, or any conunittee of either House or
any joint committe.e of the Congress --
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.
c. ~it1e 18, U.S. Code, §1510, provides:
Obstruction of criminal investigations.
(a) v,Thoeverwillfully endeavors by means of bribery ~
misrepresentation, intimidation, or force or threats
thereof to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communica-
tion of information relating to a violation of any
criminal statute of the United States by any person
to a criminal investigator; or
Whoever injures any person in his person or
property on account of the glvlng by such person or
by any other person of any such information to any
criminal investigator ~
Shall be fined not more than $5,000, or
imprisoned not more than five yea.rs, or both.
(b) As used in this section, the term "crLmf.naL
investigator" me an s any individual duly authorized
by a department, agency, or armed force of the United
States to conduct or engage in investigation of or
prosecutions for violations of the criminal laws of
the United States.
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Discussion
Guided by the general principles of conspiracy law outlined
above, one must review the evidence in the Watergate area with special
sensitivity to any showing of facts or circumstances tending to prove
or disprove Presidential knowledge of the conspiracy or intent to join
it.
The President's wo rds , as we'll as his other actions, at each
step of the way from June 17, 1972 l1ntil the present day must be scrutinized
to determine whether they manifest his knowledge, suspicion or ignorance
about critical facts.
It should be noted that, strictly speaking, if the President
became a party to an ongoing conspiracy at any time after the Watergate
break-in, his criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. §37l would immediately
attach. Any discussion of events occurring after the point (if any) at
which a Hember of the Couunittee might conclude that the President had
joined the conspiracy, would therefore be pertinent to the establishment
of additional liability for substantive offenses committed after his entry.
Similarly, a Member's perception of the duration and nature of the President's
involvement, if any, could be thought pertinent either in aggravation (if the
involvement was early and active) or mitigatio~ (if the involvement was later
and passive) of Presidential culpability. As is often true in ordinary
\.criminal cases, some facts and dates may be thought not only probative of
whether the President joined the conspiracy at all, but also relevant to the
question whe the r it is appropriate for the Congress to impose in this case
[12338]
;.~ -13·-
the sole sanction available to it, namely, removal from office.
There follows, accordingly, a general overview of the evidence,
intended to offer, for purposes of analysis only, an explanation of the
President's words and actions which differs from the theory of criminal
conspiracy adopted in principle, if not in terms, in the Summary of
Information prepared by the Majority staff. The hypothesis is that
of an upward cover-up, that is, a pattern of activity on the part of
many of the President's close aides and associates designed to shield
him from, as well as to conceal from the American people, the true
facts regarding the involvement of themselves and others in the planning
and execution of the burglary and bugging.of the Democratic National
Committee headquarters and other activities which the conspirators
desired to keep secret.
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